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WHAT STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD AFFECT A DECISION
BY THE UNITED STATES TO INTERVENE WITH MILITARY FORCE IN
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point,
New York, 1981

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
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
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
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

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the
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ABSTRACT

WHAT STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD AFFECT A DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES TO INTERVENE WITH MILITARY FORCE IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA? by MAJ Mark R. Seastrom, USA, 197 pages.

This study begins by examining the pressures which might lead to a U.S. deployment of military force to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concluding that U.S. military forces might well find themselves committed to Bosnia without an appropriate mission, the study seeks to determine what measures might be taken to restore strategic rationality once such a decision has become policy. The path chosen to meet this challenge includes a detailed examination of the problems of Bosnia, some of the myths and realities associated with military intervention in the area, and an assessment of U.S. interests. The thesis concludes that feasible, suitable and acceptable peace enforcement options exist that would very probably achieve a desired political end-state--acceptance of a Vance-Owens type peace accord by the major parties involved. This study further concludes that the range of military options short of peace enforcement in Bosnia have little to recommend them, except to mitigate a decision by the U.S. to accept the division of most of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

What strategic considerations should affect a decision by the United States (U.S.) to intervene with military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina? This question has become more than academic, with increasing calls for the U.S. to assume a more active, military role in the conflict appearing in the domestic media, legislative hearings, and within the executive branch.¹

This study suggests that military intervention by U.S. forces against the Bosnian Serbs may offer the only possibility to create the conditions for a political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 and perhaps beyond. Achievable military objectives in Bosnia do exist that would support a political objective of conflict resolution. At least two pragmatic U.S. interests support the many ethical concerns that could justify the cost of intervention. A U.S. military involvement in Bosnia that does not attempt to make peace will contribute nothing beyond short-term humanitarian relief. Moreover, performing an exclusively defensive mission substantially increases the risks to U.S. forces from all belligerents.

Defining possible military missions in Bosnia requires some consensus as to the terms and conditions of various military options. The United Nations (U.N.) has defined several intervention terms to provide a common frame of reference among U.N. members. The U.S. will incorporate at least four of these definitions into its lexicon: peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peace support operations.²

Peacemaking is the process of applying primarily diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, and other types of nonviolent techniques to settle disputes and resolve their causes. Yet, the term peacemaking has had a very different usage, often referring to military operations designed to impose a peace on warring parties.

Peacekeeping involves non-combat military operations conducted by external military forces introduced into a conflict area with the consent of all major belligerents. Peacekeeping incorporates a variety of mechanisms designed to monitor and aid in the implementation of existing truce agreements. Peacekeeping is not intended to impose a settlement among hostile factions, but simply to assist in achieving conditions conducive to diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes. While outside military forces do not have combat missions in peacekeeping operations, this does not preclude self-defense. In addition, the escort of humanitarian relief operations permits the use of armed

force to protect escorted materiel and personnel. Chapter six of the U.N. charter discusses peacekeeping operations.

Peace enforcement entails the threat or use of armed force to coerce hostile groups into compliance with sanctions or resolutions defined by the international community. The U.N. charter provides for these types of operations under chapter seven. Rarely invoked by the U.N., peace enforcement might also include future military operations authorized by regional associations. Peace enforcement should replace the term peacemaking in the near future; however, both expressions still appear in discussions addressing coercive military interventions.

Finally, peace support operations embrace all methods employed to bring or maintain peace in areas of conflict or potential conflict. The word peacekeeping has often appeared in discussions as synonymous with the term peace support.

In this discussion, the U.N. definitions for various peace support operations will be used. Thus, all provisions for the use of armed force for coercive means will be referred to as peace enforcement. All references to the employment of military force short of compelling acceptance of external resolutions among the belligerents will be considered peacekeeping. Certain of these operations, such as the armed escort of humanitarian relief convoys, clearly can and do create situations that approach the definition of

peace enforcement. For the sake of clarity, any military operation that exclusively concerns providing safe passage for aid supplies will remain a peacekeeping operation.

The President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, has variously pleaded for and demanded foreign military intervention to assist his internationally recognized government, a request he has found only partially granted.

President Izetbegovic asked for U.N. peacekeepers to prevent open warfare as early as 23 December 1991, in conjunction with his reaffirmation that Bosnia-Herzegovina would become an independent state.³ The European Community (EC) had imposed an application deadline of 23 December for any of the former Yugoslav republics who wished to be considered for recognition.⁴ The war in Croatia gradually diminished in intensity in Fall 1991. U.N. peacekeepers were scheduled to begin entering Yugoslavia in January 1992, but with a mandate for Croatia only. The Croatian and Muslim representatives in the Bosnian parliament had already voted to move Bosnia towards independence in mid-October 1991. Serbian representatives had countered with the threat to take Bosnian Serb areas into a greater Serbia.⁵ Thus, Izetbegovic knew that, by complying with the 23 December suspense, he risked an explosion of the political storm into an outright war.⁶

On 30 December 1991, Haris Silajdzic, the Bosnian Minister of International Cooperation, officially requested international recognition in letters presented to all nations that had accredited embassies in Yugoslavia.⁷ On 8 January 1992, President Izetbegovic announced that Bosnia-Hercegovina had been invited to apply for recognition by the EC.⁸

At this point two Balkan nations went ahead with recognition. Turkey became the first nation to recognize Bosnia-Hercegovina on 11 February 1992.⁹ Bulgaria did likewise on 25 February; however, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganev noted that diplomatic relations would await a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.¹⁰

In compliance with the major EC condition, the government of Bosnia-Hercegovina held a referendum on 29 February and 1 March 92 in which over 60 percent of the population voted for independence and secession.¹¹ The first contingent of peacekeepers arrived in Sarajevo on 14 March, but only with a mandate for supporting UN activities in Croatia.¹² By mid-March, Iran had extended recognition to Bosnia-Hercegovina.¹³ Izetbegovic continued to hold out hope for negotiation during this time. Dramatically increasing violence and the bias of the Yugoslav Army in Bosnia in favor of the ethnic Serbs prompted other members of his cabinet to renew the call for international military assistance on 27 March 92.¹⁴ Various agreements reached in

Belgrade among Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to construct an independent, jointly administered government to enact the 1 March referendum collapsed by early April.¹⁵

Nonetheless, the EC recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina as an independent state on 6 April 1992, with the U.S., Croatia, and Slovenia following suit on 7 April.¹⁶ Hungary granted recognition as well on 9 April.¹⁷ Thus, with the exception of Romania and, of course, Serbia, all the states surrounding the former Yugoslavia had recognized Bosnia. In conjunction with EC and U.S. recognition, Bosnia-Hercegovina's claim to be a sovereign nation-state seemed to be validated. The U.N. began the process of admitting Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, 9 April also brought Izetbegovic's first calls for foreign military intervention to make peace as opposed to preserving peace. Mobilization of the Bosnian Territorial Defense Forces had failed to generate sufficient forces to halt the deterioration of the security situation.¹⁸ Algeria recognized Bosnia on 29 April 1992, followed shortly by the remainder of the Islamic states, revealing the decided importance Bosnia had assumed in the Moslem world.¹⁹

As the military position of the Bosnian government stabilized in early May, Izetbegovic again asked for outside military assistance, this time to open humanitarian assistance routes.²⁰ Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated on 13 May 1992 that U.N. peacekeepers could not

be sent to Bosnia due to the level of violence. The U.N. did admit Bosnia-Herzegovina with full membership status on 22 May 1992.²¹ Romania finally recognized Bosnia on 30 May 1992, the last of the Balkan states to do so. Romania acknowledged that U.N. admission, "consecrated its [Bosnia-Herzegovina] joining the international community of states with full rights." A Romanian Foreign Ministry spokesman further noted that the majority of European states and numerous third world countries had already taken this step.²²

By 8 June, the military situation had once more deteriorated. Izetbegovic again asked for armed intervention on his country's behalf, specifically for U.S. airstrikes against Serbian artillery positions shelling Sarajevo.²³ That same day the U.N. Security Council voted to authorize the first deployment of 1100 peacekeepers to Bosnia to reopen Sarajevo International Airport. While U.N. peacekeepers had earlier been dispatched to Sarajevo, their mandate exclusively concerned support of the U.N. Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) operations in Croatia.²⁴ The mandate did not authorize any actions beyond the provision of humanitarian relief to areas where the belligerents acquiesced.

Because a ceasefire could not be implemented, the original plan to deploy a French infantry battalion to Sarajevo changed.²⁵ The Security Council instead voted on

29 June to deploy a Canadian mechanized infantry battalion from UNPROFOR in Croatia to Sarajevo; this time the peacekeepers arrived.²⁶ While sympathetic, President George Bush told Izetbegovic, during a meeting in Helsinki on 9 July, that the U.S. would not bomb Serbian artillery positions around Sarajevo but would ensure the delivery of U.N. humanitarian aid.²⁷

Izetbegovic appreciated international support for humanitarian relief operations in Bosnia but in the context of a first step towards peace-enforcement. In fact, a New York Times article of 12 August reported that Izetbegovic had refined the requirement for foreign military assistance as 10,000 ground troops with helicopter support that would neutralize Serbian artillery concentrations.²⁸ By 13 August, the Security Council had authorized all necessary measures, including military force, for nations to guarantee delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina.²⁹

Another Security Council vote on 14 September specifically authorized military convoy commanders to use force if attacked or blocked in order to deliver relief supplies. The same day, in response to a report from the U.N. Secretary General that more military forces were required in Bosnia for humanitarian relief support, Britain, Canada, Spain, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark committed 5300 additional troops. While the approximately 1500 troops already present in Bosnia were

under U.N. control, the additional forces were offered as national forces with costs and authority retained by the participants. Thus, military intervention for humanitarian relief resulted in situations whereby nations such as France have military troops wearing "blue berets" (U.N. designation and control) alongside other French troops operating under the French flag, who cooperated with the U.N. command. Conversely, the U.K. elected to assign its additional forces to the U.N. command. Despite these unusual circumstances, the mandate for both "kinds" of forces remained exclusively limited to escorting humanitarian aid convoys.³⁰

Support for military intervention in Bosnia beyond the escort of humanitarian relief convoys did grow, including such unlikely bedfellows as Denmark and the Islamic Conference Organization. In Denmark, a participant in peacekeeping operations in Croatia, the Social Democrat and Conservative parties reached agreement in July 1992 on the need for Danish soldiers to participate in a "Western humanitarian intervention to protect the civilian population in Sarajevo and other parts of strife-ridden Bosnia-Herzegovina." This declaration extended beyond the need to protect humanitarian convoys to include establishing protected zones for refugees by offensive action. Further, the Conservative party declared that the Bosnian situation required a force similar in nature to that assembled under U.S. leadership to deal with Iraq.³¹

The 46 member Organization of Islamic States (also known as the Islamic Conference Organization or ICO) began calling for military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in August 1992. Turkey, representing both its regional interests in the Balkans as well as the ICO in the London peace conference for the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, announced that the ICO sought a limited military intervention in Bosnia unless some diplomatic progress materialized.³² While Turkey has served as the liaison between Europe's Bosnia initiatives and the concerns of the Islamic states (in addition to its own interests in the Balkans), Iran has assumed leadership among those states and groups dramatizing the inevitable conflict between Islam and Christianity.³³ Major papers in Turkey, Iran, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have demanded formation of an Islamic coalition to assist the Bosnian Muslims.³⁴

In the U.S., various media, political, and academic pundits have contributed a large and diverse body of opinion on the utility and responsibility of the U.S. to become more decisively engaged in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. The ineffectiveness of U.N., EC, or U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the conflict has resulted in ever larger numbers of foreign troops entering Bosnia with no mandate or capability to resolve the conflict. Debate concerning the need for a military solution to Bosnia's problems has both intensified

and become interwoven with the issue of deploying U.S. combat forces into Bosnia. In fact, apparently logical calls within the Bush and Clinton administrations for U.S. military intervention have been synthesized as a moral imperative from the linkage of U.S. interests with Bosnia's dilemma. These arguments carry significant risks, as an examination of two editorials proposing U.S. military intervention demonstrates.

An advocate for limited U.S. military involvement, A. M. Rosenthal, has written:

In Bosnia the moral duty of the West is to save Muslims from slaughter and rape, perhaps by opening a corridor for food and medicine and creating safety zones.

But trying to restore the rule of Muslims to every Bosnian district they once controlled would mean full-scale war against a passionate enemy. One way or another Americans should know Clinton's war goals so that they and Congress can decide if they want to go along.³⁵

The transition from "moral duty of the West" to "Clinton's war goals" revealed an apparent linkage between U.S. involvement, the military solution, and the degree to which Bosnia's government might restore control over its territory. Rosenthal dismissed the objectives of Bosnian national forces or their nominal Croatian allies. Equally surprising, Rosenthal ignored the impact U.S. military intervention might have on simultaneous diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to achieve a political solution. Moreover, the presumption was that the West must be led into military action by President Clinton. Rosenthal

suggested a military resolution to this conflict would be ugly, yet the humanitarian objectives he proposed would otherwise have proceeded interminably--fostering a clear disconnect between U.S. interests and a military solution to Bosnia's problems.³⁶

Leslie Gelb, soon to take over leadership of the Council on Foreign Relations, has championed the need for a U.S. led military intervention in Bosnia.³⁷ In January 1993, he presented the details of one such concept, which unfortunately, did not include a method to terminate the conflict or prevent its escalation:

First, Western leaders must be honest with their people about the stakes and the risks of inaction, and clear about their limited goals and strictly limited means.

Second, Western or certainly U.S. military involvement should be restricted to airpower. Either the Serbs accept a full cease-fire or NATO aircraft attack Serbian military targets in Bosnia and Serbia.

Third, and this is critical, the Muslims and Croats themselves must supply the necessary ground troops. NATO should arm them appropriately and amply.

Fourth, these troops should concentrate on protecting safe havens. And NATO should provide food and shelter for the havens immediately.

This plan for getting in does not guarantee a way out. It does offer way to reduce the slaughter and limit the West's military role.³⁸

Earlier in this same article, Gelb identified stopping the Serbian aggression against the Bosnian Muslims as both the goal of his proposals and a necessity for any peace settlement to occur. While Gelb defined what the U.S. military will do as part of a total military solution, the

interaction he described with Bosnian and Croatian ground troops appears to be dubious. Having been fully armed and equipped, Bosnian and Croatian forces would not willingly limit themselves to acquiring and guarding safe havens. Such restraint would exist only because a coalition forced the Bosnians and Croats to limit their military objectives. Compelling such obedience would require the U.S. and other concerned participants to share very similar feelings as to what legitimate expectations the Bosnians are entitled to have; further, agree upon the means employed to bound Bosnian forces.

The military solution presented by Gelb presumes airpower alone will compel the Serbs to halt their aggression. But, what does the U.S. do if the Serbs simply accept being bombed or the Bosnians and Croatians refuse restrictions? Like Rosenthal, Gelb assumed U.S. military and political objectives to be compatible with a solution to the conflict. Worse, the idea that the U.S. could walk away from the air campaign, if it proved ineffective, patently ignores the political and psychological ramifications. As with Rosenthal, Gelb's proposals engender a disconnect between U.S. interests and a military contribution to solving Bosnia's difficulties.

The dangers of moral advocacy cited above do not arise from any fallacy in the authors' ethical premise. The flaws lie with the presumption that U.S. military power will

be effective and decisive by reacting to the Bosnian conflict's symptoms. U.S. interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina are presented out of context with other U.S. interests. Military force is proposed as necessary to treat some symptoms of Bosnia's problem, but out of context with other symptoms, the base problems, and probable political outcomes. The result is a justification for near-term military involvement that has little consideration for the consequences. As both Rosenthal and Gelb discover, a U.S. military reaction is neither necessarily decisive nor a solution. This does not mean that U.S. military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina should not or will not occur, nor that it cannot contribute to U.S. political objectives. The discussion must, however, move from one of knee-jerk reaction to one of thoughtful response.

Since the U.S. accepted a global leadership role after World War II, many U.S. commitments have been assumed as a necessity of the moment and, once taken up, resourced as part of foreign policy.³⁹ The concern in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina lays in defining such national necessity --if it exists--logically and with some consideration of the possible outcomes. Reaching some sense of the strategic considerations requires analysis that does not so quickly tether moral outrage, U.S. interests, and a military solution to Bosnia's problems. In the U.S., the decision to put armed forces at risk must be based upon practical

political as well as moral imperatives. But before proceeding, it would be beneficial to explore several of the influences that have contributed to the pressure to react to Bosnia, as these forces must likely still be accommodated.

Media coverage of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a manifestation of and a contributing source of pressure upon governments and institutions to react. Horrible situations elsewhere in the world, particularly in the nations that comprised the former Soviet Union, parallel developments in Bosnia. Yet these other crises have evoked comparatively little public concern in the U.S. and few calls for military intervention. At least part of the explanation rests with the fourth estate's detailed and vivid coverage of the Bosnian nightmare.

Perhaps less obvious is exactly how media reporting has simultaneously contributed to confusing the issues, while contributing to the increased moral-ethical imperatives to act. Appendix A presents the results of an analysis of daily reporting on Bosnia in the Christian Science Monitor from October 1991 through December 1992. The results apply similarly to other major print media sources.⁴⁰ While a detailed examination of the analysis will be addressed later, several points warrant acknowledgment.

Fifteen various contributing factors to the war in Bosnia have been identified by the Monitor, along with

sixteen different symptoms of the conflict. Seven factors fell into both categories in the sense that they were proximate causes or symptoms and assumed relevance in the other category. For example, violence against civilians and civilian institutions was both a symptom of the early stages of the war (April and May 1992) and developed into a motivating factor supporting further mobilization and expansion of the conflict. Adding to this complexity, Sarajevo has waxed and waned as a focal point, peaking in July 1992. The various causes and symptoms have likewise risen and fallen in prominence of reporting. In short, the conflict in Bosnia has presented different faces. As the foci have changed, so too the public debate concerning the need for military intervention has ebbed and flowed. There is a an observable correlation between the discussion of intervention and the focus of the moment.

Contributing as well to the fickle nature of responding to Bosnia's trials is the more difficult to resolve analytic problem of cumulative effect. For example, the mass rapes of Muslim women have tended to remain a focus of certain editorials even when current reporting in the Monitor does not. Further complicating the effort to achieve consensus on addressing Bosnia's plight is the lack of comprehensive summarizing. Over the fifteen month period, no single issue of the Monitor summarized the causes

and symptoms of the conflict. In fact, no contiguous sixty days of reporting adequately recounted the causes and symptoms.

Thus while the media generates pressure to respond to Bosnia's plight, it also contributes to complicating an already complex public debate. The cumulative effect, in combination with specific, ever-changing symptoms that continue to be graphically described in daily reporting, have and will continue to have the result of supporting moral arguments that the time for decisive intervention in Bosnia has come. In response, decision-makers must continually seek to clarify the various causes and symptoms under discussion. The media pressure for "decisive" action has spawned additional influences that have also pushed for immediate U.S. military involvement.

Suggestions for any military intervention in Bosnia to make peace often assume the U.S. military as both the most capable of and necessary to implementing any perceived valid military solution. After all, Operation Desert Storm showcased the U.S.: its destructive power, its deployability, and its ability to maintain an offensive coalition military effort. In fact, the U.S. appears to be the only power that could alone deploy and sustain hundreds of thousands of soldiers, estimates which have been posited for specific scenarios in the former Yugoslavia.⁴¹ And once stated, these numbers have tended to stick in the

lexicon of the media and the U.S. government, even while the problems in Bosnia have continued to evolve and be reevaluated.⁴²

However, if the use of military power is appropriate to achieving some part of a resolution in Bosnia--yet to be defined, that solution should not be construed as automatically meaning that either U.S. armed forces or massive intervention are requisite. Every military problem has a unique character; other military forces may offer better chances of success without rather than with the U.S. military. U.S. military intervention might, for instance, have political limitations attached which would degrade the ability of a coalition to exercise the desired level of violence or assume the needed risks to personnel. Or, from a different perspective, if a successful military intervention requires principally light-armor units, then the U.S. has limited ability to contribute to the ground combat forces.⁴³ If domination of the skies over Bosnia is the single military task, then European air forces could achieve this goal without U.S. assistance. Therefore the case for U.S. military contributions to a military solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina must correlate to a particular military strategy.

Another contributing factor to the premature linkage of the U.S. military to a military solution in Bosnia rests with discussions of military intervention which address only

the action and reaction vis-a-vis the military objective(s). Other instruments of power are either omitted or isolated from one another, permitting only the crudest cause and effect relationship between them. Perhaps the most glaring example of this phenomenon can be found in proposals for an air exclusion zone over Bosnia. Clearly the U.S. military can dominate the skies over Bosnia, but achieving that military objective does not translate into any significant change in Bosnia's situation.

General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made the argument that proposed military solutions to the Bosnian crisis should not be detached from the other elements of power. He cited the ethnic and religious complexity of Bosnia. He stated that a political solution must finally settle the crisis in Bosnia as well as the rest of the former Yugoslavia. He noted that "military force is not always the right answer." His most persuasive argument continues to be the lack of a clearly understood political objective to be achieved. Failing the definition of such an objective, the military cannot develop a complementary military strategy and objectives. Furthermore, General Powell found he could not reconcile any of the proposed military actions for Bosnia-Herzegovina with a potentially achievable political objective. General Powell has established stringent definitions of feasibility: to either win a decisive military victory or assure the

ability to compel a change in an opponent. Anything less and the military is reduced to fighting a limited war, which Powell notes, risks pointless danger (Beirut and the Marines) and undesirable escalation (Vietnam).⁴⁴

Limited wars, with undefined or merely preliminary political objectives, tend to short circuit the military's ability to plan a campaign towards an end-state. Worse, the military is then committed no matter that military force may become counterproductive to the follow-on political strategy or objective. General Powell's comments remain pertinent as long as proposed military actions offer little likelihood of even assisting in the achievement of U.S. and its allies declared political objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Clearly, military power affects and is affected by the integrated application of economic, political, or informational (psychological) power to achieve a policy objective.⁴⁵ The prerequisite to an appropriate military strategy is the postulation of an appropriate grand strategy for the Balkans which establishes U.S. objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴⁶

Unfortunately, the unique place of military power among America's other elements of power often encourages the detachment described above. For instance, Casper Weinberger's 1984 speech to the National Press club detailed the risks inherent in each deployment of U.S. combat forces.⁴⁷ Concerned with avoiding another Vietnam War, he

presented six tests to serve as a guide for committing U.S. troops.⁴⁸ These tests are still cited (by General Powell for example) as an analytic method for determining whether or not to deploy U.S. forces overseas. The final test, "the commitment of U.S. forces should be a last resort," supports an interpretation of all the tests to mean that the other elements of national power are superceded, not augmented, by the decision to use military force. Weinberger's model, while useful, discourages examining the contribution all elements of power may make in achieving a policy objective, or expressed another way, that the whole may be more than the sum of its parts. The concern is to avoid unnecessarily requiring military power alone to achieve political objectives.

All of the shortcomings described above arise from their own combination of pressures. The U.S., the only remaining military superpower and leader of the victorious coalition in the Persian Gulf War, raises expectations of military effectiveness that are both comforting and unrealistic. Representatives of governments and international agencies face the frustration and general recognition that other solutions, such as economic sanctions, have so far failed.⁴⁹ For a variety of reasons, the media contributes to the shifting nature of the problem or problems portrayed. Taken in total, pressure within and

on the current administration for the U.S. to do something to mitigate some of the problems facing Bosnia will continue.

Despite the problems identified with the debate about possible U.S. military intervention, such debate will continue. Quite possibly U.S. forces may be deployed to Bosnia with little consensus as to their appropriate purpose. Providing a method to determine appropriate military objectives in such circumstances is possible. The complexities of the Bosnian situation and U.S. foreign policy objectives must be explored in more detail to provide a basis for rational decision-making. Then, even given an irrational political action, at least some basis for restoring rationality exists.

This brings back the primary question, **what strategic considerations should affect a U.S. decision to intervene in Bosnia with military force.** In other words, if a deployment becomes a political response to particular developments in Bosnia, overlaying a national and military strategic assessment can offer guidance as to objectives to attempt and to avoid. Hopefully, the path to relinking the action to U.S. national interests and goals will also be easier. However, to answer this question requires research into three subordinate questions.

What are the problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
Evaluating these problems, in particular their origin and

continued relevance, will help discern which are the most significant, possible solutions, and the anticipated costs of resolution. Ideally, a few properly selected problems can be identified whose resolution would reduce the sum total of Bosnia's problems to an acceptable level. Logically, some of this "short list" of problems might require military power to resolve. Therefore, the perceived problems which would effect a military intervention in Bosnia must be evaluated as well.

What U.S. national interests are at stake in Bosnia-Hercegovina? Determining if and to what degree the U.S. has a stake in Bosnia-Hercegovina will provide some yardstick by which to gauge the level of risk the U.S. could be expected to accept as part of its grand strategy for the area. This analysis includes identifying the interests of other powers in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Yugoslavia, such as the Islamic states. A U.S. desire to support the interests of other states, could affect U.S. actions and risk-taking in Bosnia-Hercegovina which would otherwise appear anomalous. Conversely, foreign concerns might prohibit U.S. actions which appear to be in its own national interest.

What constitutes suitable, feasible and acceptable U.S. military actions in support of solutions to the problems of Bosnia-Hercegovina? Resolving this question demands a reconciliation between the "short list" of problems and U.S. interests to posit the useful military

strategies available to achieve various political resolutions. This will include describing and evaluating the risks and benefits associated with achieving those end-states.

As indicated in the third subordinate question, the purpose of the analysis is to apply a litmus test of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability to possible U.S. strategies which include military components. William Staudemaier defined the terms suitable, feasible and acceptable as a method to evaluate strategic concepts.⁵⁰ Suitability implies that achieving an action or policy should in fact provide a desired effect. Feasibility requires sufficient resources to exist to achieve an objective in relation to the forces which could or will oppose such action. Acceptability balances the costs (social, economic, political or military) of attaining an objective with the anticipated benefit.

A Brief Review of the Literature

With the turmoil that has resulted in the dissolution of the former republic of Yugoslavia, hundreds of articles have appeared in periodicals. Dr. Timothy Sanz accomplished a significant literature review of periodicals from Spring 1991 through July 1992 for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth. Of particular note, the Radio Free Europe Research Report series and Foreign Broadcast Information Service publications provide two of

the few consistent sources for translations of articles from Serbo-Croatian. While periodical articles offer some depth, nearly all make certain presumptions about the nature of the governments and peoples that are not clearly stipulated. In fact, even the several dozen longer essays to be found in such journals as Foreign Affairs approach the subject with a variety of perspectives and agendas to promote. Such differences would seem to mirror the policy debate underway within the Clinton administration.

Such limitations, of course, apply for every complex subject addressed in these media. However, two difficulties make this material significantly less trustworthy. First, there is little consensus about the history of the Yugoslav republics. Therefore, the historical grounding of every author has great and often unstated impact on his assumptions, interpretations, and even facts. Second, the contentious nature of Yugoslav politics since the death of Tito in 1980, modern information recording and retrieval techniques, and the metamorphosis of the Yugoslav political system provide quotations from every key political entity that support any number of viewpoints.

Thus, extracting the maximum value from the most current articles requires consideration of the various authors' perceptions of the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina's place in it. Fortunately, enough books have appeared recently that a contemporary appraisal of the many

interpretations of Yugoslav history is possible. Misha Glenny's work, The Fall of Yugoslavia, offers perhaps the most balanced consideration of the various participants and their interpretation of history. Close behind in value is Mark Thompson's A Paper House, whose chapter on Bosnia-Herzegovina attempts to analyze the various perceptions of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.³¹ Thompson is associated with a Slovenian magazine, which brings another difficulty to light.

Nearly every English language scholar of what was Yugoslavia either is of Serbian, Croatian, or Slovenian extraction or was educated by such individuals. A notable exception can be found in the works of Fred Singleton, who basically created Britain's first postgraduate school of Yugoslav studies. Singleton, and those who followed in his path, represent the Yugoslav socialist viewpoint, essentially a fourth view of contemporary Yugoslavia. Thus Twentieth Century Yugoslavia, written in 1976, is still a valuable source, given the recent lack of enthusiasm among authors for Tito's form of government.

An excellent work which takes a harsh view of Yugoslav socialism is Bogdan Denitch's Limits and Possibilities: The Crisis of Yugoslav Socialism and State Socialist Systems. Denitch presents the anti-socialism view fairly distinct from any prejudice towards a national group, which is unusual. The care with which controversial and

recent historical facts are presented is noteworthy.

Another source commendable for detail, although slightly dated, is Ivo Banac's The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. While canted towards a Croatian view of the world, Banac presents at times excruciating detail in support of his views, including innumerable direct citations from documents and papers. From his presentation of the rise of Bosnian Muslims as a nation, many would also characterize him as pro-Muslim. Despite the controversy surrounding some of his conclusions, Banac's work is probably the most commonly cited English language reference to be found in other books. Alex N. Dragnich's Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia reads as somewhat of an apology for Serbian aspirations. Nevertheless, he offers some logical counterpoints to the widespread condemnation of the Serbian nation in the West.

Finally, Barbara Jelavich's two volume History of the Balkans yields not only some valuable references to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, but also provides them some unique context.

There are many substantial State Department briefings, Congressional Committee proceedings, and other government-sponsored panel reviews available since January 1991 which address humanitarian issues, refugee concerns, in depth situation reports, and U.S. foreign policy towards the nations of former Yugoslavia. These records serve two

valuable functions. They document the opinions of a variety of government officials, both inside and outside the State Department. Moreover, these records provide to identify the various interest groups lobbying for a particular position from Congress towards the ethnic and political groups of former Yugoslavia.

Another invaluable source for tracing both U.S. State Department actions and executive branch positions on the former Yugoslavia is the State Department Dispatch, a biweekly publication of the U.S. government. More views on U.S. foreign policy and U.N. peace support operations have been documented in several journals, the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and several monographs. The base references for consideration of foreign policy and national power topics raised in this study are John Spanier's Games Nations Play, Ray Cline's World Power Trends, John Lefever's Ethics and American Power, and Graham Allison's 1969 article, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review. Cline posits one method for evaluating national power as a function of resources modified by strategy and national will. Allison relates three particularly useful models (rational policy, organizational process, and bureaucratic politics) for describing how governments make decisions. Lefever's work documents the original "Weinberger Doctrine" and George Schultz's companion article, often cited as the counterpoint

to Weinberger's six tests for committing U.S. armed forces overseas.

Retracing day to day events and actors in the former Yugoslavia is assisted greatly by events calendars. Three of the best include Dr Sanz's reference (cited above), the monthly recapitulations in Current History, and the weekly highlights published in the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report series. Details, perceptions, and people change so quickly that daily newspaper reporting and Foreign Broadcast Information Service publications provide indispensable additional coverage.

Not surprisingly, published information on the military forces actually engaged in Bosnia is sketchy with Jane's Defense Weekly providing the most reporting. The authors providing the most details are Dr. James Gow and Dr. Milan Vego. Dr. Gow lectures at the Center for Defense Studies, King's College, University of London. Dr. Vego, born in the former Yugoslavia, teaches East European history and politics in the U.S. In conjunction with bits and pieces extracted from newspapers and other periodicals, a reasonably accurate portrayal of the military situation is possible.

Endnotes

1. For example, given the failure of diplomatic and economic pressure to limit Serbian aggression in Croatia and then Bosnia, Anthony Lewis called for the United States to employ air power over the skies of Serbia and Bosnia to compel Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, to stop the siege of Sarajevo by ethnic Serb military forces, "The New World Order," New York Times, 17 May 1992, sec. D, p. 17.

Also, in June 1992, Senators Paul Simon, Joe Biden and Clairborne Pell remarked during testimony by Secretary of State James Baker to the Senate Foreign relations committee that U.S. military power appeared increasingly necessary to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid into Sarajevo. Secretary Baker responded that recent developments supported such a conclusion, "Baker Hints at the Use of American Forces to Supply Sarajevo," New York Times, 24 June 1992: sec. A, p. 9.

2. Major Richard Brennan, a Strategy, Plans and Policy analyst in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, confirmed U.S. acceptance of these U.N. definitions for categories of intervention in an April 1993 briefing at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

3. Carla Thorson, "Developments in Bosnia," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report on Eastern Europe (RFE/RL) 1, no. 2 (10 January 1992): 70.

4. Jonathon Landay, "EC Deadline Pushes Bosnia to the Brink," Christian Science Monitor, 20 December 1991, 1.

5. The 15 October 1991 memorandum did not actually call for Bosnia to secede from Yugoslavia, but affirmed a 1990 constitutional amendment which asserted the sovereignty of the Bosnian-Herzegovina. However, the Serbs correctly understood that the intent was to lay the legal basis for independence. A motion to vote on Bosnia's future was introduced, but failed to carry, even though the Serb delegates had walked out. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) EEU-92-043 (4 March 1992): 40 and Milan Andrejevich, "Bosnia and Herzegovina Move toward Independence," RFE/RL 2, no. 43 (25 October 1991): 22-27.

6. RFE/RL (10 Jan 1992): 70.

7. FBIS EEU-92-002 (3 January 1992): 42.

8. FBIS EEU-92-005 (8 January 1992): 43.

9. FBIS EEU-92-030 (13 February 1992): 31.

10. FBIS EEU-92-038 (26 February 1992): 39-40; EEU-92-039 (27 February 1992): 32.

11. While most Serbs boycotted the vote, nearly every 68% of the total population did vote. Over 98% of those voting chose independence. Current History 91, no. 565 (May 1992): 240.

12. Cyrus Vance, the UN special envoy, still did not endorse a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It could be argued that enough difficulties in establishing the force in Croatia had already been encountered. Any attempt to expand the mandate could have resulted in further delays. Current History 91, no. 565 (May 1992): 240 and Milan Andrejevich, "More Guns, Less Butter in Bosnia and Herzegovina," RFE 1, no. 11 (13 March 1992): 14.

13. Current History 91, no. 566 (September 1992): 289.

14. Current History 91, no. 565 (May 1992): 240.

15. RFE/RL 1, no. 14 (3 April 1992): 66, 77; 1, no. 15 (10 April 1992): 68; 1, no. 16 (17 April 1992): 71-72.

16. Greece followed the EC lead on Bosnia-Herzegovina despite its reluctance to set a precedent by which the EC might pressure Greece into Macedonian recognition as well. FBIS WEU-92-070 (10 April 1992): 39; EEU-92-051 (16 March 1992): 17.

17. F IS EEU-92-070 (10 April 1992): 17.

18. FBIS EEU-92-070 (10 April 1992): 31.

19. FBIS NES-92-083 (29 April 1992): 12.

20. FBIS EEU-92-091 (11 May 1992): 24.

21. Current History 91, no. 566 (September 1992): 290.

22. FBIS EEU-92-105 (1 June 1992): 31.

23. "As Shells Devastate His Capital, Bosnian Leader Begs U.S. to Help," New York Times, 9 June 1992, sec. A, p. 10.

24. Which is not to say that the UNPROFOR in Sarajevo did not begin evaluating the airport prior to the U.N. vote. In fact, the peacekeepers in Sarajevo served as key negotiators in the agreement which made the reopening of

the airport possible. However, it is significant to note that not until 8 June had the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR to be deployed to Bosnia with any mandate relating to the crisis in Bosnia. Current History 91, no. 566 (September 1992): 294 and conversation with a source assigned to UNPROFOR.

294. 25. Current History 91, no. 566 (September 1992):

26. Ibid., 295.

27. Ibid., 300.

28. RFE/RL 1, no. 33 (21 August 1992): 73.

348. 29. Current History 91, no. 567 (October 1992):

30. FBIS WEU-92-181 (17 September 1992): 10-11 and "U.N. Approves More Troops for Bosnia," Prodiqy Services, 15 September 1992.

31. FBIS WEU-92-176 (10 September 1992): 29.

32. FBIS NES-92-174 (8 September 1992): 48; NES-92-160 (18 August 1992): 3-4; NES-92-152 (6 August 1992): 2.

33. FBIS NES-92-174 (8 September 1992): 48; NES-92-118 (18 June 1992): 39.

34. FBIS NES-92-160 (18 August 1992): 3-4; NES-92-132 (9 July 1992): 15; NES-92-177 (11 September 1992): 46-47.

35. A. M. Rosenthal, "Two words uttered by FDR 50 years ago made all the difference," Kansas City Star, 14 January 1993, sec. C, p. 15.

36. Such a strategic gridlock already exists on Cyprus, where peacekeeping forces have been deployed for over two decades. In Bosnia, a similar commitment would be complicated by no green line (line of demarcation) and consequent difficulties in securing humanitarian lines of supply over the long-term.

37. Gelb's future position on the Council for Foreign Relations was noted in a New York Times editorial carried in the 13 May 1993 Kansas City Star. The Council publishes Foreign Affairs, a foreign policy journal that provides good insights into the thinking within Washington across various political and ideological lines. Gelb

currently serves on the journal's board of advisors.

38. Leslie Gelb, "Vance and Powell," New York Times, 10 January 1993, sec. D, p. 23.

39. David Jablonsky, Why is Strategy Difficult? Professional Readings in Military Strategy No. 4 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992), 51.

40. Specifically, the New York Times, Economist, Newsweek, and Time covered very similar material in the time period reviewed.

41. General Barry McCaffrey, speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff cited daunting figures for certain scenarios in Bosnia. For example, an army of 400,000 "would be needed to "impose a cease-fire and occupy territory in the disputed areas of the Balkans." To ensure delivery of food to Sarajevo via land and air, GEN McCaffrey estimated a corps of 60,000 to 120,000 troops to secure a 20 mile ring around the airport in Sarajevo and guard the 200 mile land corridor from the Croatian port of Split to Sarajevo. He did however call this "a seat-of-the pants answer." Michael Gordon, "60,000 Needed for Bosnia, A U.S. General Estimates," New York Times, 12 August 1992, sec. A, p. 8.

Time magazine reported that NATO military experts had considered proposing 100,000 soldiers to guard the Split to Sarajevo land link and later discussed a force of 10,000 to perform escort duty along the route as opposed to guarding its entire length. "Can Bosnia Be Fixed With a Hammer?" Time, 31 August 1992, p. 16. While these estimates are not universally accepted, that aspect will be examined in the body of this paper. The point here is simply that such estimates exist.

42. For example, Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger discussed the quandry faced by the United States in assessing what it could do about ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia stating, "I don't know how you deal with it unless what you're prepared to do to assure success is to put in several hundred thousand ground troops, US or whatever. I don't think the American people are prepared to accept that." (Note the connection between the estimate for hundreds of thousands of soldiers, securing all contested areas, and no other proposal for stopping the process of ethnic cleansing.) Peter Grier, "West Still Drags Feet on Measures to Stop the Killing in Yugoslavia," Christian Science Monitor, 28 December 1992, 1.

43. The U.S. essentially has no light tank or assault gun force, excepting the very small fleet of irreplaceable and venerable M551 Sheridans. While Armored

Gun System (AGS) is planned for procurement, no U.S. Army unit fields them at the time of this writing. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle offers possibilities as its weight is about the same as the German Panzer Mark IV employed in Yugoslavia in World War II.

This issue really revolves around the question of what military tasks are required to be performed. If chasing guerrilla forces through the Bosnia's mountainous terrain is the task, then specific equipment (and training) issues become especially relevant. If engaging former Yugoslav National Army mechanized and motorized forces is the primary task, then U.S. equipment would be generally quite suitable for employment. This question will be addressed further on in the paper.

44. Michael Gordon, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No On Using Limited Force in Bosnia," New York Times, 28 September 1992, sec. A, p. 35 and Colin Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992, sec. A, p. 35.

45. For the purposes of this paper the political instrument of power will include: diplomatic measures, the domestic and international processes of consensus building, and the galvanizing of national will. For a demonstration of a model incorporating the elements of national power, see David Jablonsky, Why is Strategy Difficult? 17-27.

46. This relationship is explained in more detail in Arthur Lykke, Jr.'s article, "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," Military Strategy: Theory and Application (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1989), 3-8.

47. Casper Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Ethics and American Power Ethics and Public Policy Essay 59, ed. Ernest Lefever (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1985), 1-10.

48. Ibid., 7-8. It is worthwhile to review the tests as Weinberger specifically described them, given the various summarized interpretations that have followed.

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement of occasion is deemed vital to our national interest of that of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as we did in Korea in 1950, that a particular area is outside our strategic perimeter.

2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so

wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.

Of course, if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties and remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces could then perhaps have prevented the holocaust of World War II.

3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. We should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war--or, rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."

War may be different today than in Clausewitz's time, but the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital national interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job--not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping.

4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed--their size, composition, and disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions: "Is this conflict in our national interest?" "Does our national interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?" If the answers are "yes," then we must win. If the answers are "no," then we should not be in combat.

5. Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, but just to be

there.

6. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

49. Arguably U.N. sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro were not tightly enforced through much of 1992, however the impact of sanctions on the economies in question was still deleterious.

50. William Staudenmaier, "Strategic Concepts for the 1980's," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 5 February 1981), 14, quoted in Arthur Lykke, Jr., "A Methodology for Developing a Military Strategy," Military Strategy: Theory and Application (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1989), 11.

51. Thompson's epilogue did not reflect the same degree of logic or research as the main body of the book. Instead, Thompson gave free rein to an invective directed against the Serbs. Frustration with the tragedy in Bosnia has affected many other authors. For instance, Misha Glenny's epilogue reflected some disillusionment; however, not on a scale comparable to Thompson.

CHAPTER 2

PRECONFLICT BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

The purpose of this analysis is not to relate the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The objective is to examine the various current problems to determine relative importance, possible solutions, and possible costs. However, an historical context is unavoidable as so many of Bosnia's present difficulties relate directly to differing perceptions of historical events among Bosnia's three main ethnic groups.

Bosnia's development as a state and the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a narod (people) within former Yugoslavia merit a brief review for several reasons. Perhaps, most important, any judgements reached in this paper will reflect a bias developed in the course of the research. At least by presenting the basis for these views, the reader can judge for himself the logic of the author's subsequent conclusions. Even the most cursory study of Bosnia's current predicament reveals that part of any resolution will require decisions which will reject the perceived rights of at least one aggrieved party.

One the most glaring errors in discussing the ethnic groups of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and one repeated in this paper

for the sake of clarity, is to apply the terms Croats, Muslims, and Serbs as totalities. The predominantly Muslim Bosnian government includes many urban Croats and Serbs. While Muslims make up the majority of the loyal citizenry, many of those who had identified themselves with the Yugoslav ideal also stayed in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Mostar. Conversely, some Muslims supported Bosnia's Serbs in an effort to maintain Bosnia's state integrity within a new Yugoslavia.¹ Intermarriage and a growing identification with the cultural and economic ideals the West in the 1970s have undoubtedly contributed to the phenomenon of interethnic cooperation still observable if muted after a year of civil war.²

The ethnic groups separate culturally and economically along rural and urban lines. Thus the Bosnian Serbs, who constitute less than 40 percent of the population, occupy almost 60 percent of the land in Bosnia as farmers. A large percentage of Bosnia's Muslims live in cities, which decreases their share of acreage occupied proportionally. Finally, all urban ethnic groups tend towards mutual tolerance to a degree normally not required in rural settings.

Besides these urban versus rural differences, regional differences in Bosnia create distinctions among ethnic groups as well. For example, the Croats of western Hercegovina have remained a distinct group even among other

Bosnian Croats. The Serbs of Krajina and east Hercegovina retain unique characteristics as well. The Muslims of the Bihac region are geographically isolated and culturally distinct from the central Bosnian Muslims. These differences seem to have been dismissed by outside observers since the war in Bosnia began. The point is that while senior political and military leaders in Bosnia now speak as if they represent an ethnic monolith; in fact they are spokesmen for coalitions of regions and municipalities. Any analysis of the Bosnian crisis must, therefore, recognize these limits on the legitimacy of Bosnian leaders.

The ethnic groups of former Yugoslavia have a strong sense of history. Normal practice finds current social and political problems expressed in metaphors from the past.³ Conflicts in Bosnia have and continue to incorporate specific historic themes which inspire and justify the actions of Bosnia's Serbs, Muslims and Croats.

One theme often repeated throughout the Balkans since the nineteenth century rests upon nationalist claims to the greatest extent of land once controlled by an associated medieval empire. These kingdoms represented alliances of nobility under the banner of a local dynasty. The fact that none of the Balkan medieval states met the modern criteria for a nation has been largely ignored by most nationalists.⁴ While Croat and Serb claims to part or all of Bosnia have been well-publicized, the existence of a

Bosnian kingdom, which actually outlasted the Croat and Serbian empires, is often overlooked. As these historic claims to specific territory and greatness persist, it is useful to quickly summarize the key figures and lands associated with their kingdoms.

Tomislav (910-928) founded established the first Croatian kingdom on the Dalmatian coast, an area under the nominal control of the Byzantine empire.⁵ What we consider northern and central Croatia, at the time, lived under Frankish control. With recognition by Pope John X given in return for Tomislav's rejection of Byzantine (and therefore Orthodox Christian) authority, Croatian power centered in the vicinity of Biograd-na-Moru, near modern Zadar and Sibenik on the Dalmatian coast. Zagreb only became the focus of Croatian politics after the amalgamation of Tomislav's state under Kalman (King of the Magyars) in 1102.⁶ At its zenith in 1070, all of Bosnia was under Croatian rule except for eastern Herzegovina and north eastern Bosnia.⁷

One of the three original Serbian tribes, the Hum, settled in eastern Bosnia. These three tribes formed a defensive union to oppose the Bulgars in the ninth century. This confederation linked the lands now known as central Bosnia, Montenegro and Kosovo.⁸ The rise of the Serbian kingdom of the Nemanjic dynasty under Stephen II occurred in 1217. At one time almost one third of modern Bosnia-

Hercegovina, everything east of the Neretva and Drina rivers and that portion of central Bosnia between the rivers, came under Serbian control. By the time Stephen Dusan's legendary south Balkan empire (1331-1355) extended Serbian power to its greatest extent, most of Serbian Bosnia had actually been lost to an expanding Bosnian kingdom.⁹ The defeat of the Serbian kingdom in 1371 by the Turks split two of the three original Serb tribal groups from the remnants of Serbia, who eventually became part of the Montenegrin and east Hercegovinian Serb (Hum) peoples of today.¹⁰

The first Bosnian independent kingdom arose under Tvrtko (1353-91), "King of the Serbs, Bosnia and of the Coast." This kingdom appeared as the Serbian empire came under assault from the Turks. Serbian refugees crossed the Drina river boundary into Tvrtko's kingdom to join their brethren already residing in central Bosnia. While only lasting until 1463, the Bosnian kingdom comprised central Dalmatia and most of modern Bosnia-Hercegovina, less the northwestern corner.¹¹

In summary then nationalist claims to territory can be traced to these kingdoms. The Serbian and Croatian claims also include royal houses recognized by the Orthodox and Catholic churches respectively. This distinction is relevant, since such lineage provides an unbroken cultural link from the medieval period into the modern nation-state era in Europe. The Bosnian Muslims lack this ancestry. The

majority of the Bosnian nobility cast their lot with Islam and the Ottoman empire. To some Serbs and Croats, this difference implies that only Serbian and Croatian territorial claims have modern validity. Of course to Bosnian Muslims, their ancient heritage remains legitimate, despite the lack of a hereditary royalty. Thus nationalist claims to sovereignty remain a matter of ethnic perception. And to the outsider, none of the claims appears superior to the others.

Another historical theme that has been employed in Bosnia-Hercegovina to justify conflict is the religious one. The Roman Emperor Diocletian first drew the political boundaries which distinguished between the western empire and Byzantium in 285 AD. This line of political demarcation, further specified by Theodosius in the fourth century, splits Bosnia. This physical separation corresponds approximately with the eventual predominance of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches.¹² Caught in between these two at times antagonistic religious forces are the Bosnians.

Claims that the Bosnian Muslims are simply fallen Catholics or Orthodox Christians have reappeared.¹³ History does not support such an interpretation. A heretical Bosnian church appeared in the eleventh century known as the Bogomils. Persecution by Catholic and to a lesser extent Orthodox empires resulted in the much of

Bosnia's slavic population readily embracing Islam after the Turkish occupation began in 1463.¹⁴ This conversion included nearly all of the nobility and land-owning class in Bosnia.

However, the linkage between Islam, the Ottoman yoke, and Muslim cooperation in the Croatian Ustascha purges of Serbs in World War II has also fueled concerns about the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state.¹⁵ In fact, both Serbian and Croatian officials have stated that the war against Islam never ended.¹⁶ President Izetbegovic's twenty year old treatise on the structure of an Islamic state has been toted out to prove his intent to create a fundamentalist Islamic Bosnia.¹⁷ In fact, Izetbegovic did discuss the vulnerability of individual Islamic groups, including his own. He also discussed the benefits of forming a transnational Islamic state. He later repudiated any intention he might have had to work towards a new Ottoman empire. His later writings do not suggest he returned to this theme. Considering what could be found in the twenty year old writings of most politicians, there is no reason to suspect Izetbegovic of harboring some long cherished Islamic plan. The sad conclusion seems to be that most conflicts in Bosnia have rapidly assumed the character of religious wars, no matter the pretext.

The theme that warfare in Bosnia has been a constant, epic struggle among Muslims, Catholics, and

Orthodox is untrue. Banditry does have a long tradition in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The two concepts frequently become confused in modern writings about current problems in the region. While conflict has been no stranger to Bosnia, internal conflicts were minimal from the 16th through the early 18th centuries, a fact partly due to the brutal Ottoman repression which any nascent revolt faced. The most disturbing of the internal conflicts of the early 18th century involved mostly Slavic Muslims engaged in power struggles.¹⁸ And while religious affiliation was exploited by the various empires from the mid 18th century forward, it is not until the early nineteenth century that significant internal strife began between the Christians and Muslims.¹⁹ Croat versus Serb is a phenomenon that developed in the late 18th and nineteenth centuries. World Wars I and II really provide the majority of the impetus for the theory of an "historic" Bosnian conflict.

There are, however, a few exceptions to the conclusions presented above. The most notable involves the Muslims and Serbs of eastern Hercegovina and portions of eastern Bosnia, who seem to have a centuries old violent history. This and other traditional local conflicts has helped set the standard for Balkan warfare. It is this character of warfare which is truly historic and continuous. Warfare in the Balkans has never quite advanced beyond the Thirty Years War.

Yet another theme which periodically affected Bosnia has been the idea that Bosnian Muslims do not constitute a nation in the same sense that Croats or Serbs do.²⁰ If true, then Bosnian Muslims have no similar claim to autonomy. Much of the debate concerns their apparent lack of an unbroken tradition of national consciousness. The unacknowledged assimilation of Bosnian Muslims into the original Yugoslav kingdom, the difficulty in finding population statistics which identify their status in the new kingdom, and their tendency to identify with Serb and Croatian nationalist movements prior to formation of the kingdom has been inaccurately cited as supporting this theory. Bosnia's Muslims acted as a distinct political entity prior to and during the first Yugoslav kingdom.²¹ While politically inspired, Tito's elevation of the Bosnian Muslims to nationhood was a recognition, not a creation, of their status in Yugoslavia.²²

A related theme concerns the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, challenged as mere creations of Tito to weaken Serbia.²³ In fact, Bosnia's borders under the Ottoman and Austrian empires remained about the same from the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 until 1908, when the Sandzak of Novi Pazar was divided between Montenegro and Serbia.²⁴ Saving that minor change, a decade spent under the odd administrative system of the first Yugoslav kingdom, and four years of dissolution during World War II, Bosnia-Herzegovina today

has borders which reflect almost 300 years of (externally imposed) precedent.

Another theme stresses that the Bosnian Serbs are simply part of the greater Serbian nation and therefore are entitled to be linked to Serbia, despite the intertwined Muslim and Croat populations.²⁵ Bosnia has seen many population movements as a result of war; for example, a significant migration of Serbs from the domains of the Ottoman empire settled on the Austrian military frontier with the consent of Vienna.²⁶ There were Turkish sponsored migrations of Vlach tribes to the Ottoman military frontier for defensive and economic reasons, who came under Orthodox tutelage with the consent of the empire.²⁷ During and after World War II significant population shifts occurred as well, this time for political and economic reasons. Thus, for one ethnic group to claim predominance over another by historical precedent requires the last several hundred years of history be disregarded.

A review of modern population percentages reaffirms this conclusion. In 1879, Orthodox (roughly equates to Serb population) Bosnians constituted about 42% of population, with 38% being Moslem and 17% Croat. By 1910, 43.5% were Orthodox (roughly equates to Serbs), 32.4% were Moslem, and 22.8% were Croat.²⁸ In 1946, 44.3% were Serbs, 30.8% were Muslims, and 24.0% were Croats. By 1971, Serbs constituted only 37.2% of the population, Muslims grew to 39.6%, and

Croats decreased to 20.6% of the population.²⁹ In 1981, Muslims held at 39.5%, Serbs dropped to 32.0%, and Croats had decreased to 18.4%.³⁰ While Muslims gained again 1991 with 43.7% of the population, Serbs had fallen to 31.3% and Croats to 17.3%.³¹ This does not include the effect of intermarriage, which had reached 27% among the nationalities in Bosnia.³²

Finally, the theme most often cited in the current conflict in Bosnia is World War II. Nearly every decision maker, politician and general alike, experienced that war; there were no winners and plenty of hurtful memories. Serbia's role in the war, and particularly that of the Monarchist-Serb nationalist General Mihailovic, was probably ill-served by history. Even the most conservative figures indicate over half of million Serbs died. Of the 1941 Yugoslav population of 16 million, at least 1 million died and half were civilians.³³ While Croatian Ustascha and Muslims fought multi-ethnic Partisans, the Partisans fought Serbian and Montenegrin chetniks. Chetniks and Partisans both had their fights and their armistices with the German and Italian occupation forces; however, the foreign occupation was secondary to the civil war. Every region, city and village had some slightly different experience with the various factions striving to position themselves for post-war political power and the occupation forces. Numerous militias and paramilitaries stalked local areas.³⁴

What the war confirmed and can be seen today is a sort of armed Darwinism; that is, the heavily armed dominate the well armed, the well armed dominate the poorly armed, and the poorly armed kill the unarmed.

This brief exploration of Bosnia's contentious and troubled history provides some context to examine the nature of current conflicts. As noted earlier, agreement on the interpretations and facts related here is hardly unanimous among outside analysts or the ethnic groups themselves. Still, to accomplish anything of worth in today's Bosnia, decision-makers will have to make value judgements on each ethnic groups' perception of history.

Endnotes

1. That particular union has not survived the war. The Muslim organization in question, the Moslem Bosnian Organization (MBO), had worked out a political alliance with the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in May 1991. Tanjug (Belgrade), 19 August 1991 cited in FBIS EEU-91-161 (20 August 1991): 44.

2. Fred Singleton, Twentieth Century Yugoslavia (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1976), xii and Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1992), 29-30.

3. Singleton, 29.

4. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans - Vol I (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 26-27.

5. Jelavich, Vol I, 23-24.

6. Singleton, 31-32.

7. Jelavich, Vol I, 24.

8. Singleton, 34.

9. Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 37.

10. Specifically, Bosnia's Serbs were free to join the melting pot of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, the Bosnian peoples also included Croats, Franks, Venetians, and Magyar peoples by this time. Singleton, 34.

11. The Dalmatian portion of the kingdom stretched from Biograd-na-Moru to Kotor. Singleton, 37.

12. Singleton, 30.

13. Misha Glenny, 142.

14. For more information on the Bogomil Christians see Singleton, 36; Banac, 40-41 and Mark Thompson, A Paper House (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1992), 94-95.

15. Patrick Moore, "The Islamic Community's New Sense of Identity," RFE/RL 2, no. 44 (1 November 1991): 19-23.

16. Patrick Moore, "Islamic Aspects of the Yugoslav Crisis," RFE/RL 1, no. 28 (10 July 1992): 37-42.

18. Jelavich, Vol I, 89-90.
19. Alex Dragnich, Serb and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 1-2.
20. Banac, 161-162, 181, 225.
21. Bosnian Muslim's had generally consolidated into a Muslim party prior to and during the creation of the first Yugoslav kingdom, however the principal unifying factor appears to have been land reform, as the Muslims still retained their status as the landowning class even after the departure of the Ottoman empire. This is one little discussed example of national consciousness of the Bosnian Muslims. Banac, 360-377.
- Statistical data from 1921 through the Second World War is unavailable as Muslims, Montenegrins and Macedonians were included as Serbo-Croatian Slavs in census data. Muslims become associated as a separate but equal people independently from the acceptance of Bosnia as a constituent republic. The census employed the terms "undifferentiated Muslims" in 1948, "undifferentiated Yugoslavs" in 1953, and "Moslems in the ethnic sense" in 1961 and 1971. Singleton, 219.
22. Thompson, 92-95; Glenny, 141-142 and Singleton, 236-237.
23. Dragnich, 121-122.
24. Jelavich, Vol I, 89, 99.
25. For example Thompson, 96; Banac, 163; Paul Shoup, "The Future of Croatia's Borders," RFE/RL 2, no. 48 (29 November 1991): 32-33 and Milan Andrejevich, "Bosnia and Hercegovina Move toward Independence," RFE/RL 2, no. 43 (25 October 1991): 22-25.
26. Singleton, 55, 64-65.
27. Banac, 42-43.
28. Singleton, 65.
29. Singleton, 236-237.
30. Glenn Curtis, ed. Yugoslavia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), 293.
31. Milan Andrejevich, "Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Precarious Peace," RFE/RL 1, no. 9 (28 February 1992): 7.

32. Thompson, 91.

33. Bogdan Denitch, Limits and Possibilities: The Crisis of Yugoslav Socialism and State Socialist Systems (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 134-135.

34. There is significant controversy over the history of Yugoslavia during World War II. The following works are recommended for those who wish to pursue this issue: Milovan Djilas' Wartime; Barbara Jelavich's History of the Balkans - Vol II; Alex Dragnich's Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia; Misha Glenny's The Fall of Yugoslavia; Mark Thompson's A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia; Robert Kennedy's German Antiquerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944).

CHAPTER 3

PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN BOSNIA

Surveying Bosnia's problems presents the most difficult challenge to the identification of possible objectives for U.S. policy makers. The numerous issues are more than complex, they seem to vie with each other for attention. For instance, the siege of Sarajevo dominated international interest for several months of 1992, but then paled in comparison to the issue of ethnic cleansing. Examining all of Bosnia's problems, however, reveals a selected group or "short list" of problems, which if resolved, should be sufficient to reduce most aspects of the crisis to more acceptable levels for the Bosnians and the international community.

Given the complex history of Bosnia-Hercegovina, it is not surprising that any list of current problems would be both extensive and contain interrelated topics. The method selected for identifying the majority of the current problems was to survey a well-reputed daily periodical. The Christian Science Monitor stands out for its consistent quality reporting, attention to world trouble spots, and its ease of use as a research tool. The sampling period extended from October 1991 through December 1992. The

review included every issue of the Monitor. Each issue which contained at least one article or editorial on Yugoslavia contributed to the data base. Information recorded embrace all identified causes and results (hereafter referred to as symptoms) of the conflict in Bosnia and proposals for military intervention. Appendix A contains the raw data. Chapter four contains the analysis of the problems associated with a military intervention.

Fourteen months of data furnished eight causes for the current conflict in Bosnia, nine symptoms, and seven problems which both fueled the conflict and constituted harmful symptoms. These are explained below along with the analysis to determine their continued importance and possible solution.

Causes

Serb-Croat War

The conflict in Bosnia began as an extension of the Croatian conflict currently on hold. Most of Serb held Croatian territory can only be supplied from Bosnia. The Serb-Croat fight in northern Bosnia, in the largely Bosnian Croat region of Posavina, and Hercegovina began where the war in Croatia paused, with the Croats essentially on the defensive and Serb forces attacking. And while the Bosnian war quickly fragmented into many wars, the greater Serb-Croat tension remained an important agent of the war. Some

evidence suggests that Serbia and Croatia agreed to divide most of Bosnia among themselves. This deal, if true, has limited more than halted the clashes between Serb and Croat.

The infamous meeting of the Croatian and Serb presidents in March of 1991 to agree on the division of Bosnia between them has since been allegedly followed by others.¹ While Bosnian Serb lines of communication remain vulnerable, Croatia essentially controls western Hercegovina and some of the Posavina region areas contiguous with Croatia. Presidents Milosevic of Serbia and Karadzic of Bosnian Serbia have little left to offer President Tudjman in Bosnia. However, by 1993 the Croatian Army had apparently ceased opposing the consolidation of Bosnian Serb autonomous territories, except in eastern Hercegovina. Likewise Bosnian Serbs have ceased most of the pressure on the remainder of Posavina held by the Croats. It is probable that an arrangement has been made, but one which does not include the Croatian Serb areas currently in rebellion.

Any international peace settlement in Bosnia threatens to uncouple Croatian Serb held areas from Bosnian Serb and Serbian military support. Therefore Tudjman can be expected to support such an arrangement, biding his time to take Croatian Serb areas by force. Of course all the Serb military and political leaders realize this; therefore they will have to be coerced to back such a plan. The Krajina

Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia present a special case, wild cards in any proposed settlement. General Mladic, commander of at least some of the Bosnian Serb forces, former commander in the Knin part of Croatian Krajina, and the son of parents executed by the Ustascha in the Second World War is the most important wild card. He can be expected to oppose any arrangement which makes the Serb autonomous zones in Croatia more vulnerable, no matter the circumstances.² In addition, he personally can count on the loyalty of up to three of the Bosnian Serb corps if he chooses to challenge the authority of President Karadzic.

Another wrinkle in resolving this issue are the paramilitary forces of the Party of Historic Rights (HSP), known as the Croatian Defense Forces (HOS), who have large forces in Hercegovina. Up to 20 percent Muslim, these forces have fought to maintain Bosnia's integrity, but have been engaged by the Bosnian Croat regular Croatian Military Defense (HVO) forces attempting to both absorb the HOS and ethnically cleanse Herceg-Bosna (Croatian western Hercegovina) and part of central Bosnia.³ In one the strange alliances of this war, the HOS actually presents the greatest long-term threat to Bosnian sovereignty, as they believe all of it should be joined with Croatia. HOS believes the only way to accomplish this goal is to first support Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia and Serbia. A small but significant group of Hercegovinan Muslims support

this idea as their best chance to avoid Serbian domination. Bosnia's government has not been in a position to refuse HOS (or any other) military assistance.⁴

Conversely, the HVO are Bosnian Croat regular forces that represent the Croatian Democratic Community Party (HDZ), which controls most of the government in Croat held Bosnia. These forces are dependent on the government in Zagreb and augmented by Croatian National Guard (ZNG) formations (Croatia's Army). They are content to secure a portion of Bosnia, while maintaining an alliance of sorts with Izetbegovic's forces and supporting a negotiated peace plan which creates cantons in Bosnia.⁵ The HVO and Croatia control all of the Bosnian government's lines of communication.⁶ The presumption should be that Tudjman's man in Herceg-Bosna, Mate Boban, will succeed in neutralizing HOS forces and continuing with ethnic cleansing until pressure on Zagreb compels them to stop. Bosnian Croat activities against the Muslims conflict with Croatia's long-term interests and mark a division in the Croatian political military sphere potentially as serious as that between Mladic and Karadzic.⁷ It should be noted that any sea line of communication supporting a military intervention will have to cross into territory controlled by Boban.

Given the continuing Croat-Serb contest in Hercegovina, Croatian passivity in north Bosnia, and the peace that holds on Croatia's border with Montenegro a

partitioning deal would seem to have been reached among Croatia, Herceg-Bosnia, Serbia, and the Bosnian Serbs which excluded southeastern Hercegovina. This kind Machiavellian pragmatism is common in the conflict; yet deliberately denied by all sides. Admissions of any deal-making that barter some Serbs and Croats away would undermine the nationalist causes for both sides.

The Bosnian conflict in one sense remains part of a campaign in the wider Serb-Croat war. A Bosnian Serb consolidation in Bosnia no longer threatens to tilt the Serb-Croat war in Serbia's favor. When Croatia became involved in Bosnia, a concern was that the Bosnian Muslims might be overrun; a Bosnian Serb consolidation of virtually all of Bosnia would have put Croatia at a great disadvantage. The resilience of the Bosnian Muslims has now largely neutralizing the threat of a "greater Serbia" to Croatia. Tudjman has likely concluded that the Croatian Army is now strong enough to seize Serb held portions of Croatia given any of the likely outcomes in Bosnia. In fact, the engagement of what amounts to about 40 percent of the old JNA in Bosnia not only weakened that force, but also purchased the time Croatia needed to strengthen its own forces. However, if any version of a Vance-Owen plan is enacted which creates cantons linked only through internationally controlled corridors, Croatia will gain an even greater advantage.

The direct spin-offs from the larger war include: the war of the Krajina Serbs (in Bosnia and Croatia) versus Croatia (temporarily on hold while UNPROFOR is deployed there) and Bosnia's Muslims; Croatia, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims versus Bosnian Serbs and probably Serbia in southeastern Hercegovina; Croats versus Muslims in central Bosnia.

In short, a continued Bosnian conflict is then really in the hands of the Serbs from the perspective that continued fighting weakens them and a negotiated settlement short of total victory also weakens them in the scheme of the larger Serb-Croat war. No settlement, whether by arms or accord, will ultimately protect the Serbs in Croatia. While the Serb-Croat war is hardly over, its outcome has been largely decided. Only those few areas of Croatia held by Serbs along the northeastern border of Croatia can expect the new JNA to reach them when the Serb-Croat war resumes. The longer the Bosnian Serb forces fight, the greater the advantage which accrues to the Croatian Army. The Krajina Serbs will oppose any peace plan that leaves them exposed; they can count on Mladic to lead them. The conflicts in southeastern Hercegovina and central Bosnia, while horrible, are mainly efforts to improve positions prior to a negotiated agreement.

Resolution of the Krajina Serbs status in Croatia will be a critical component of any peace plan for Bosnia.

Meeting these Serbs' need for security, cultural autonomy, and limited economic and political autonomy will ultimately be the basis of a their peace and an important contribution to Bosnian peace.⁸ A Serb-Croat resolution is essentially in place in Bosnia proper.

The Independence of Bosnia

The Bosnian government's decision to seek independence from Yugoslavia prior to a negotiated political solution amicable to all nationalities provided the reason for the Bosnian Serbs to rebel. Part of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) supported the rebellion. A subordinate theme includes Serbian denial of the existence of a Bosnian nation.

The question of Bosnian independence had arisen as early as 1990, when the Bosnian League of Communists tabled a draft resolution on Bosnian sovereignty proposing confederal participation in a reorganized Yugoslav state.⁹ Also in 1990, Serbian President Milosevic authorized the arming of Serbian militia and paramilitary forces in Bosnia in an operation code named RAM.¹⁰ By May of 1991, the precursors to the Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAO) in Bosnia were in place.¹¹ In September 1991, four SAO's were declared encompassing 32 of Bosnia's 109 municipalities. Both the weapons and administration for the Bosnian Serb revolt were thus in place, when the Bosnian Presidency submitted the 15 October memorandum to Parliament, which

outlined the conditions under which Bosnia would remain in a Yugoslav confederation.¹² At that point it was clear to all factions in Bosnia that neither Croatia nor Slovenia had any intention of participating in such a confederation; therefore, neither would Bosnia.

As Croatian forces moved into western Hercegovina, Izetbegovic's Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA) began to try to arm itself for the increasingly imminent confrontation. Izetbegovic still felt certain that the government would not collapse and negotiations would keep Bosnia out of a war.¹³ In November 1991, President Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) declared the autonomy of two additional SAO's in Bosnia. With a total of 60 municipalities, the SAO's were still not solidly connected to one another, despite the absorption of twenty-three municipalities where Serbs were a minority.¹⁴

As violence increased in early 1992, negotiations which seemed to offer hope failed repeatedly. These discussions centered around a Swiss-type canton system with a weak federal government, but retaining a sovereign Bosnia.¹⁵ This sovereignty issue was the rub. For many historical and hysterical reasons there was no reason for Bosnian Serbs to desire to be part of a nation which did not include Serbia proper. When Milosevic provided the means to avoid such a fate, a civil war was imminent unless the Bosnian government agreed to join the new Yugoslavia. The

independence referendum on 29 February and 1 March, which confirmed that over 60 percent of Bosnia's total population would not join a new Yugoslavia, brought war closer. It was not until EC and U.S. recognition of Bosnia came about in April 1992 that the conflict exploded; by then it no longer remained possible that Izetbegovic could suspend the nation's independence drive to avoid war.

Given the preparations of Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs, their superiority in weaponry, the "civil war" phase of the conflict should have been brief and decisive with the JNA moving in to secure the gains in the name of restoring order. Bosnia's government would have been compelled to sign a dictated merger with new Yugoslavia. That is what should have happened. And Milosevic's lack of a fall-back position suggests it never occurred to him that the plan would fail. Two of the several reasons for the failure are important because they no longer apply. Despite two purges of the JNA officer corps and one of the army in general, significant numbers of both had no desire to participate in this war as a belligerent. By 1993 this lack of purpose had been eliminated from the remaining Serbian Army of Bosnia. Second, soldiers, paramilitaries and equipment from Croatia provided the breathing space which the Bosnian government forces needed to put an army together. This alliance nominally still exists but has significantly deteriorated.

Thus, what was never meant to be a civil war became one, with continuous Serbian and Croatian intervention also making it a national and even international war. Resolving the issue of Bosnian independence remains the single most important and difficult problem in Bosnia. Two different wars, with Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs versus the Muslims, over Bosnian independence actually developed: a military effort to force the Bosnian Muslims to accede to the partition of Bosnia; an effort to secure cities and lines of communication to connect all six SAOs with one another, particularly by the Krajina and Hercegovina Serbs. Milosevic made the war possible, but if he agrees to stop it short of the original political objective his political survival is doubtful. Therefore, to bring Milosevic to the negotiating table with any chance of a compromise being reached requires sufficient pressure be brought to bear on Serbia that popular discontent becomes a more certain threat to his political power. Until such pressure is felt, he will equivocate despite the adverse affect the conflict continues to bring on Serbia and the outcome of the Serb-Croat war.

Similar constraints apply to the Bosnian presidency and the leadership of the six Bosnian Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAO). However, they have additional difficulties to overcome. A solution whereby Bosnia's Serbs are allocated separated cantons in a sovereign Bosnia leaves the

Serbian population vulnerable not only to the real economic and perceived social threats that led them into a civil war, but also to the retribution of the largely Muslim Bosnian government. Moreover, control over the various armed factions in Bosnia is problematic; in the near-term, political leaders in Bosnia need military forces more than military forces need any particular politician. Since at least six local political power bases exist (the SAO's), even severe pressure from Milosevic might not be sufficient to bring Bosnia's Serbs to the negotiating table with any good faith.

President Izetbegovic could find himself in similar difficulties with his military commanders. Even his Chief of the General Staff, Sefer Halilovic, believes the Vance-Owen plan to be suicidal for the Muslim people.¹⁶ If the Bosnian Army ever received the military capability to wage successful offensive warfare against the Serbs, the Muslims would probably use it no matter the constraints or agreements which had been made to acquire such capability.

The only apparent solution appears to be a direct threat against the Bosnian Serb military formations which provide them with the greatest advantages against the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, namely the former JNA corps which remained in Bosnia. These regular armor, mechanized and artillery formations, plus the command and control system, provide the qualitative advantage that has secured

almost 70 percent of Bosnia. And while infantry engagements supported by heavy artillery are common, the heavy ground forces create and maintain the conditions suitable for the infantry and artillery offensives. Unless it was clear that the heavy forces were threatened with destruction, no peace plan will likely be accepted by the majority of the Bosnian Serbs. A peace plan will still have to provide some degree of autonomy within the cantons and assure freedom of movement and goods between them.

Croatia will follow whatever arrangements are made between the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs for reasons addressed earlier. The Bosnian government has had to accept that its political objective, namely sovereignty, is not achievable in the near-term. It will probably accept at least an accord which preserves the ideals of sovereignty, while creating cantons with substantial degrees of autonomy. However, Izetbegovic's more immediate problem is getting more territory. The current rump state his forces hold is economically and socially inviable. Given the Bosnian Serb's position, only two paths will provide Izetbegovic with enough territory to go to the negotiating table. Either outside military intervention must acquire or threaten to acquire territory for him (bringing the various Serb factions to accept a version of the Vance-Owen peace plan) or, the Bosnian government must be armed sufficiently to take on the former JNA regulars and win. Failing those

two options, Izetbegovic can only surrender or continue a losing fight.

If and when Bosnian independence is accepted as inevitable by the various Serb groups, the war will become one over internal borders, however the practical difference could be hard to notice.

International Recognition

International recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina prior to a negotiated political solution amicable to all nationalities provided the reason for the Bosnian Serbs to rebel. Most of the JNA in Bosnia and across the border in Serbia and Montenegro participated on the Serb side. A subordinate theme included denial of the existence of a Bosnian nation.

As discussed above, international recognition was the official beginning of the war but not the reason for it. Beginning the war then simply equated to removing the lid from a pot that was already boiling over. Certain analysts claim that the actual day of recognition was very significant, but it was the process, not the culmination of the process that made war inevitable.¹⁷ Any offer by Izetbegovic to even consider repudiating Bosnia's independence or recognition as a negotiating tool would almost certainly result in his ouster by his own party and the Bosnian Army.

Defense Industries

The portion of the former Yugoslav defense industry located in Bosnia was too significant for Serbia to live without according to some authors.

While 60 percent of the old Yugoslav defense industry was located in Bosnia, most of what remains lies under Croatian or Muslim control with the notable exception of the Banja Luka factories, which were never threatened. Given the relocation of tools and equipment to Serbia that occurred, acquiring what remains of the defense industry to be taken from Bosnian government hands would be a pointless political objective, although selective operations to destroy the few operational ones have been undertaken. By 1993, this was most certainly a dead issue.

Internal Borders

Reorganizing the internal borders of Bosnia has been an objective of the Bosnian Serbs from the outset of hostilities. Since their failure to force the Bosnian government to capitulate early in 1992, linking otherwise separate Serbian regions of Bosnia together with Croatian Bosnia to the west and Serbia proper to the east has assumed even greater importance to the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia.

The conditions under which acceptable internal borders will be determined have not been met. Any canton arrangement will likely be based upon the 1991 census for the 109 municipalities, which the Vance-Owen canton plan

mostly follows. Some adjustments which acknowledge the effects of ethnic cleansing will be permitted, when they can be justified as serving some other purpose, such as uniting economically linked cities or resources.

The complexity of internal borders virtually guaranteed a war when the Serbs decided to link their adjacent territories in their opposition to Bosnia's government. 2.7 million people live in the 82 municipalities that have an absolute (more than 50% of population) majority of Serbs (32), Muslims (37), or Croats (13). Only pluralities (less than 50% of population) comprise the remaining 15 Muslim, 5 Serb, and 7 Croat municipalities with a population of 1.7 million.¹⁸ While 44% of the population is Muslim and 31% Serb, the larger rural Serb population actually lived on almost 60% of the land in Bosnia.¹⁹ The municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina rarely correlate with ethnic divisions, instead reflecting the cities, industries, and resources of the state.

Thus, no manipulation of internal borders can produce national states within Bosnia unless massive population redistribution occurs and is accepted by all parties. This is the goal of ethnic cleansing, but it is impractical without a Bosnian Serb total victory or a long-term continuation of the conflict. Otherwise, under a Vance-Owen type peace plan, for instance, some 40 percent

of the Serb population (as of Spring 1992) would be outside Bosnian Serb areas. Even if the Bosnian Serbs cleansed every village they controlled, most of these other Serbs have their jobs, homes, land and family ties elsewhere. Exchanges of houses and property have so far accounted for only a small percentage of the population and there is little indication such a program has any popular support.

Of additional importance to the Bosnian Muslims will be regaining some sort of access to the Neretva river valley and Mostar, which leads to their nearest sea access at the Croatian port of Ploce. A canton arrangement that does not accommodate this need will leave whatever central government and the Bosnian Muslim's extremely vulnerable to Serb or Croat economic pressure in the future. As stated earlier, Croatia will likely accommodate such access, and a Muslim lifeline to Ploce virtually assures Croatia's receipt of more assistance in restoring the port's damaged facilities.

Therefore solving the internal border problem requires one or more actions: successful ethnic cleansing, an externally (i.e., U.N. sanctioned) enforced and financed population redistribution as part of a settlement, or the establishment of an effective federal or confederal system. Explaining the latter thought further, a political settlement would require granting some degree of autonomy to the various cantons. To balance these cantons' power, individual rights must be equally strengthened through a

judicial system. Since a strong federal system capable of enforcement is unlikely to come about, a very large foreign civil and police presence will be needed for many years, along with some military forces. This presence might permit the formation of an acceptable judiciary and supervise the enforcement of its civil pronouncements.

As the likelihood of some agreement which preserves Bosnian independence through cantonization occurs, the two wars involving the Muslims and Serbs which developed from the independence movement will become wars of internal borders as territorial adjustments and defining the terms of canton autonomy replace the immediate objectives of creating a unified greater Serbia. Such a transition could happen at different times for Serbia and the six Bosnian SAOs. For Serbia, preserving access across republic boundaries and securing guarantees for Bosnian Serb protection will become paramount. Each of the SAO's can be expected to make final territorial acquisitions and to try to complete population adjustments (migration, ethnic cleansing, etc.). One observable difference marking the transition could well be individual SAO's attempting to make separate peace settlements with the Bosnian government before acceptance of a Vance-Owen peace plan in the hope of receiving better border arrangements.

The Croatian-Muslim alliance may have begun to come apart in a struggle over internal borders and ethnic

cleansing in selected areas by late Spring 1993. If this becomes a sustained conflict, a new war will have begun, probably in the belief that a negotiated settlement is coming. If true, then the Muslim-Croat conflict should last only until a Vance-Owen agreement is endorsed by the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims, although ethnic cleansing could continue into the Vance-Owen plan's implementation.

Economic Concerns

Bosnian raw materials and manufacturing are critical for the economic recovery and vitality of the new Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Another aspect is that the war provides economic opportunities to carry away war booty, perhaps serving as a major source of new wealth in the Serbian economy.

Bosnia's wealth lies in raw materials and factories. The value of Bosnia's mineral resources remain limited by the expense of transporting them.²⁰ Exceptions are the iron and bauxite mines which are very productive. The chief iron ore producing areas in former Yugoslavia lie in Bosnia, at Ljubija near the Croatian border and in the upper Bosna basin at Vares, between Sarajevo and Tuzla.²¹ The other major iron ore mines are located in Macedonia, although other mines do exist near Trepca and Bor in Serbia.²² Bauxite ore sites are in Croatia, north and east of Sibenik (currently under Serb control), Montenegro around Niksic, and around Mostar.²³ Serbia cannot readily replace these

ore sources, given the embargo, but in the near-term they are not critical as most Serbian iron and bauxite consuming industries have either months of products stored that cannot be sold or are limited by the embargo on importation of other raw materials.

Bosnia became the main beneficiary of Tito's industrial development for three reasons. Tito wanted new industries away from the border regions in case of war. The factories in Bosnia also served to inject wealth and capital into a deprived region. Finally, many factories were built in Bosnia to be dependent upon raw materials or contract work from other republics, reinforcing the economic interdependence of all the republics.²⁴ These factories have value to local Bosnian Serbs, but their contribution to a greater Serbian economy is minimal without Bosnian Muslim participation in the system.

In short, acquiring Bosnia's raw materials and factories through war cost more and gained less than a negotiated resolution to Bosnian Serb economic concerns would have achieved. Thus, these resources did not serve as a cause of the war, but as a supporting objective once war became inevitable.

The economic cost of the Bosnian conflict, factoring in the loose embargo enforcement on Serbia and Montenegro, suggests that the Serbian economy may actually collapse if the war continues much longer and U.N. sanctions are

enforced more rigorously. While prophets forecast the failure of Serbia's economy for more than six months before 1993, the demise of one of two banks paying astronomical interest rates on hard currency deposits indicates that most of the 100,000 Belgrade clients of the Yugoskandic Bank became paupers overnight. The other super bank, Dafiament, slashed interest rates on hard currency from 15 percent to 4 percent per month.²⁵ In short, part of the unofficial economy has crashed.

While economic disparities between the republics were a major factor in the break-up of Yugoslavia, economics affected Bosnian Serb motivations only in the sense that their over-representation in the government controlled business apparatus began to disappear in the late 1980's. While disenfranchisement was significant as a motivation for the war, the conflict in Bosnia has since transcended this issue. However, any successful long-term settlement must still provide conditions for the economic recovery of Bosnia.

Serbian Coast

Bosnia is the gateway for Serbian aspirations to own a port on the Adriatic.

Since the withdrawal of JNA forces from the Prevalaka peninsula on Croatia's Dalmatian coast and the inability of Croatian Serb forces to take the port of Zadar, this has become a dead issue. Serbia will remain content

with its rail access through Montenegro to the port of Bar on the Adriatic.

Yugoslav Army

There are two twists to the JNA as a cause of the war. The new Yugoslavia cannot sustain either the size or privileges of the old officer corps. Therefore, officers and careerists of Bosnian Serb origin must regain their security in a Bosnian Serb state. Another view is that the mostly Serb JNA was and the new Yugoslav Army is simply supporting and protecting the S. rb population of Bosnia. The remaining JNA forces have become distinct Bosnian Serb forces and continue to be the dominant aggressor in the military conflict.

As James Gow points out in Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis, the JNA maintained the legitimacy of the Yugoslav federal state in the face of growing republic demands for self-determination from the 1970's through the mid 1980's. When it became employed as a tool of the Serbian government in Croatia and later in Bosnia, many officers still believed they would be part of the solution not the problem. That said, the JNA officer corps had been purged once after Croatia and later again as the Bosnian conflict heated up. Milosevic had made it clear that much of the officer corps could not expect to be retained in the service if they returned to Serbia from Bosnia.²⁶ Enough of the JNA (both in Serbia and Bosnia)

approached its task in Bosnia with zest to affirm that the officer corps had been coopted as an institution.

The formation of the General's Party, otherwise known as the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia (SK-PJ), was originally designed to speak on behalf of the Army as Yugoslav society began to fall apart. It became radicalized and sponsored the most powerful of the Serbian paramilitaries, the Serbian Volunteer Guard. Thus part of the Yugoslav Army officer corps certainly took umbrage with the breakup of the Yugoslav state in Bosnia and Croatia. That said, the issue of preserving the status of the officer corps in Serbia has become separate from the war in Bosnia. The Yugoslav Army's remaining motivations in Bosnia appear to be at the direction of Milosevic.

Both the Bosnian Serb officer corps and the new Yugoslav Army officer corps remain key players in the conflict. While Milosevic has at least secured the Yugoslav Army²⁷, Karadzic has no such control over General Mladic or any of the other former JNA corps commanders operating in Bosnia. The solution for dealing with them is as described above concerning bringing the Bosnian Serb politicians to the negotiating table.

Causes and Symptoms

Nationalism

The conflict in Bosnia was caused by devolution of power from the League of Yugoslav Communists to almost

exclusively ethnic nationalist parties. As the war continues, those who would have preferred to avoid joining the nationalist bandwagon are compelled to do so for survival. Nationalism serves as a unifying cause for Serbia and Croatia to continue supporting the Bosnian Serbs and Croats respectively. A subordinate theme includes historic claims by Serbia and Croatia to all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The cynical exploitation and then dismissal by Milosevic (and Tudjman for that matter) of nationalist fervor illustrates that this war did not begin for nationalist reasons but was possibly due to ethnic nationalism.²⁸ Once triggered, nationalist civil wars normally must burn themselves out.²⁹ As a year of brutal warfare concludes in Bosnia, such fatigue should become visible. In Serbia, the strain has been apparent for months, but for the new Yugoslavia this is a nationalist war of intervention and not a civil war. This fact, plus the time and energy Serbia had already invested in the war fought in Croatia, is likely to bring Milosevic to the negotiating table before the Bosnian Serbs.

As Bosnia's Serb and Muslim populations grow weary, the military and political forces prosecuting the civil war will come under increasing pressure to define, and accept if offered, some terms to resolve the conflicts, both on a local level and across Bosnia. How long it might take for such pressures to manifest themselves in Bosnia will be

determined to a large degree by future actions of the U.S., the U.N., the EC, Russia, and regional states. Depending on how a military intervention might be conducted, for example, could dampen or inflame the nationalist causes which now work to keep the conflict going.

Addressing nationalism requires an acknowledgement that the goal cannot be to eliminate such motivations, but to accommodate them. Accommodation means both meeting certain nationalist objectives, such as cultural or local political autonomy, and presenting credible evidence that further pursuit of nationalist goals will not yield any profit; further, risks losing what has been gained.

Militias and Paramilitaries

The conflict was initiated by local militias acting independently and paramilitary groups intentionally creating incidents. As the conflict continued, these forces conducted many of the worst acts of the war, turning victims and potential victims into active participants in the conflict. Various armed forces appeared and associated with local political leaders.

These forces have committed the majority of brutal, senseless acts, although regular army units on all sides have contributed. The Serbian paramilitaries have the dubious distinction of being the most efficient. Chapter four describes some of these forces in greater detail. The conclusions are that these forces were important combatants

on the front lines in the early stages of the war in Bosnia. However as professional military forces developed on all sides the paramilitaries were either absorbed into regular chains of command or refocused their efforts on captive populations behind the front lines. Similarly, the militias were either relegated to their home regions, where they became the tools of local politicians (or turned the politicians into tools), or absorbed into the regular military structure, adopting partisan unit designations.

The paramilitaries have become mostly exploiters of the war, although plenty of true believers in their cause exist. If and when the major military forces of the combatants cease fighting, a major policing effort will be required to neutralize them. The potency of these local militias and paramilitaries in the absence of regular armed forces suggests that a peace accord not totally disarm all sides. Any foreign force assuming a nonaggressive posture is vulnerable, as current U.N. operations point out, to hit and runs. On the other hand forces conducting peace enforcement operations would find it relatively easy to destroy or evict local militias or paramilitaries. Transferring this task to the canton or other regional authorities established under a peace plan is desirable in short order and probably feasible, as the paramilitaries tend to be no one's friend.

Despite their vulnerability, rogue units of all

types will attempt to prevent any peace agreement from being implemented for nationalist as well as purely business reasons. In addition, local grievances or feuds will continue to assume nationalist trappings.

Anti-"Federalism"

The war began as Bosnian Muslims and Croats, with some urban Serbs, fought against being dominated by Serbia in a new Yugoslavia. The fight against unitarism continues to its logical extreme with many local regions, municipalities, and forces in Bosnia increasingly acting independently of the three nominal governmental agencies in Bosnia (Serb, Croat, and Muslim/Government). As a result, reaching a political solution to the conflict becomes increasingly difficult.

One long-term problem facing Bosnia is that any federal or confederal structure will lack legitimacy for many years. Only a peace plan and economic restoration will create the conditions for a central authority to possibly earn legitimacy. And in fact, planning should be based on the assumption that confederation not federation will result from a Vance-Owen type plan, no matter the name ascribed to the central government in a peace accord.

Propaganda

Various ethnic and religious themes were employed to create distrust and hate. Violence, particularly against

civilians, became acceptable in the name of religious or ethnic purity. As the war continued, the forces released in portions of the population defied control and the propaganda became reality as ethnic and religious groups were drawn together in conflict. In addition, the producers of such propaganda risk losing their credibility and power if they give up control.

Propaganda continues to be the almost the exclusive domain of the politicians in power in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia.³⁰ Urban areas often have access to other points of view, but television and most country-wide print media remain exclusively in pro-government hands. Television remains the most influential media in Serbia.³¹ These controls must be challenged enough to encourage dissent and increase opposition access without unduly antagonizing those in power in both Serbia and Croatia. Outside intervention in the means of communication should be limited to supporting opposition coalition parties in their efforts to regain access to their respective publics.

A settlement in Bosnia must guarantee access to the media for all sides and carefully guard against isolation of regions from print, radio or television media. Croatian and Serbian media reporting have been and will remain important sources of information for Bosnians. If a military intervention in Bosnia is proposed, it will be important to ensure the outside forces access to the media as well. In

fact, providing some of the respected reporters from Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia with access to the intervening military forces and operations could be extremely valuable in countering rumors and propaganda. That of course means deploying the technical means to gain access to the airways.

Violence

The war grew in response to acts of violence directed against both civilians and military forces. The violence continues to feed on itself, growing ever larger. Violence, particularly against civilians, shatters lives, producing ever more people who have reason to never forgive or forget what was done to them. And of course there are the total number of dead and missing, somewhere between 60,000 to 134,000 by March 1993, mostly Muslims.³² This in turn will make a political settlement more difficult to implement on the local level as time goes by.

Understanding violence in Bosnia offers the West great difficulty. During a war there will always be the sadists and former Yugoslavia has more than its fair share. But the more important and frequent uses of violence by all sides can be comprehended. First, violence serves as a propaganda tool, aiding ethnic cleansing. Balkan heritage accepts violence against enemy civilians during wartime to a greater degree than in the West. Second, violent acts serve as a communications means during negotiations. This fact has become doubly true with foreign involvement in the

negotiations. Because the outside world has exercised its ability to help or hinder the factions, when negotiations are demanded of the factions, they negotiate. They even sign things, like cease-fires, because they are expected to. But, it is important for each side to also let the other know what is actually acceptable; thus, violence becomes the medium. This last point is definitely in force during general cease-fire discussions and local negotiations concerning the sieges of cities. While uncontrolled elements have been rightly blamed for actually violating many a cease-fire, it is highly suspect to pretend, for instance, that a man like Mladic could not think of a means to reign in the most dedicated anarchist if he so chose to do so.

Dealing with violence in Bosnia requires the presence of an armed force which is focused on preventing conflicts, but will react decisively when challenged, a role the JNA filled successfully for many years. For now, an external force which is capable and permitted to use decisive force will be required. Attempting to disarm the entire population is neither feasible nor desirable as local self-defense will be required for some time to come. Most internal security forces will have to be rebuilt. Therefore some portion of the regular military forces of each side need to be retained to impose internal order if the foreign military commitment is to be lessened in the near and

long-term. Any peace accord will require a significant foreign civilian and police presence to help restore order, protect the citizenry, and provide redress for the victims on all sides.

Historic Hate

The war in Bosnia is perceived by many participants and observers as a resumption of an historic struggle between: Serb and Croat; Serb and Muslim; Catholic and Orthodox; Orthodox and Muslim; Catholic and Muslim; East versus West. The longer the conflict continues, the more parallels that are drawn with a violent past. Education has begun to inculcate the youth of all sides with values developed by the propaganda organs.

For reasons addressed earlier in this chapter, the attempt to cite historic ethnic or religious conflict as the primary cause of the war in Bosnia does not stand up to scrutiny. This is not to say that important, long-standing conflicts such as to be found in the hills of Hercegovina do not exist and have not had an effect. The atrocities of World War II were easily called upon to explain the war. But these people lived together for more than 40 years in peace. More than just tolerate one another, they intermarried, they established friendships and personal business relationships. Or examine the debacle the JNA went through in Croatia as a result of poor morale and poor recruiting among Serbs to fight Croats.³³ No, historic

hate did not cause this war but enough time has passed that hate now fuels it.

Ethnic or historic hate is the motivation and rationale which many Serbs, Muslims, and Croats have called upon to explain the armed manifestation of their anger and fear. To say that historic hate has always dominated these people, unless an outsider holds a gun to all their heads, is as simplistic as saying they have lived the past 50 years in a constant state of anger or fear. However, the combination of real violence, World War II memories, propaganda, and the protracted nature of the war has created a whole new generation of people in Bosnia who will carry hate into the future, and even believe it is attributable to the historic ethnic conflict among Muslims, Croats and Serbs. Time and an accurate accounting of all sides' atrocities will be required for any long-term reconciliation. In the interim, a wary truce supervised by outside agencies is probably the best hope.

Ethnic Cleansing

One purpose of the war has been the creation of ethnically pure areas of Bosnia for Serbs, a purpose now at work in some Muslim and Croat held regions as well. As regions are purified, it becomes unlikely that political control over these regions will have to be shared and even less likely the original inhabitants will dare to return. Successful operations invite continuation of the policy to

its logical conclusion. Characteristics of ethnic cleansing include the rape of Muslim women, bombardment of civilian populations, killing or imprisoning local authorities, destroying dwellings and religious buildings, and selective violence to encourage the remaining population to sign their property rights away in return for safe passage out of the cleansed area.

Ethnic cleansing is not genocide; it is not merely creating refugees. Refugees and violence against civilians appear in every war, but ethnic cleansing represents a deliberate attack on a people as occurred in Stalin's Russia and Mao's China. It falls closer to genocide on a spectrum of man's inhumanity to man, than the haphazard atrocities of most civil wars because it is a deliberate and coordinated policy. Ethnic cleansing provides the moral imperative for foreign powers to take the risk of getting involved in finding solutions to Bosnia's war. All ethnic groups have been guilty to some degree, but the Bosnian Serbs have clearly demonstrated the greatest culpability, according the U.N. Human Rights Commission.³⁴ Unchecked, Serbs will kill, expel, or compress Bosnia's Muslim population into an unstable, unsustainable puppet state.

Stopping ethnic cleansing is possible only if the war ends and conditions created for less violent population migrations. In the Vance-Owen plan for example a significant portion of each ethnic group is located in

municipalities under another's control. It is highly unlikely that minority status in a canton will be acceptable to everyone, although provisions to support the many who will stay or return must be provided as discussed earlier. The option to relocate with assistance is an admission that not every Bosnian community can be protected from ethnic cleansing, even with a Vance-Owen plan implemented.

Another option must be considered to stop ethnic cleansing. The argument postulated above and even earlier in this chapter presumed that a peace plan is functioning. However, stopping the conflict may require some kind of military intervention. If no military intervention is forthcoming, then the alternative is for the U.N. to sponsor and finance the large scale redistribution of the population into ethnically pure cantons. This alternative, however repugnant, might be the only way to halt the ethnic cleansing. Once the populations were redistributed, Bosnia would certainly disappear as the Croatian and Serbian cantons joined their parent states. The remaining Muslim cantons would eventually have to choose between Croat or Serb association, since they would be isolated economically and geographically.

Symptoms

Air Attacks

Serbian aircraft and Bosnian Serb aircraft repeatedly bombed civilian targets through much of 1992.

This is a dead issue with the U.N. imposition of a no-fly zone over Bosnia.

Hostage Taking

It has become common practice for local groups to attempt to influence events on their territory through holding other ethnic groups as hostages. The practice has stopped U.N. aid convoys many times. Mutual hostage taking has often been employed by local belligerents to neutralize one another.

Hostage taking will become the method of choice for manipulating any foreign force which attempts to make or keep peace in Bosnia. Small unit commanders will require training in negotiating techniques and clear guidance on what the rules of engagement and occupation policy permit. Only resolution of the ongoing conflict will lead to the gradual demise of this tactic.

Rape

While large numbers of women are raped in most wars, substantial evidence indicates that at least some if not all of the Bosnian Serb forces conduct mass rapes as a method of warfare and a method of ethnic cleansing.

The U.N. Human Rights Commission found that Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing included the practice of systematic rape of the Muslim female population.³⁵ This problem will only be solved when a solution to ethnic cleansing is achieved. Rape in and of itself was not a motivation to wage war but has become a weapon of war.

Sieges

The predominant Bosnian Serb tactic to take a city is by siege. Gradually seizing the surrounding villages and dominant terrain, they rely upon starvation and the lack of essentials (medicines, etc.) and the psychological effects of bombardment and lack of communications to force a surrender. In essence, the civilian population becomes the weapon of choice to overcome the defending forces.

Only external ground forces can break sieges. As discussed earlier, they must be foreign troops or rearmed Muslim troops.³⁶ Air power in Bosnia cannot break a siege. Large numbers of air strikes could make siege warfare expensive and demoralizing to continue. Of course, the humanitarian relief personnel in Bosnia would have to be withdrawn while the air attacks occurred, since U.N. personnel would become targets of opportunity. It is seemingly forgotten in the media that artillery does not maintain a siege, that is the role of infantry, armor, and mechanized forces. Air power would be a valuable component

in breaking a siege in support of an external relieving force.

Bombardment

Bosnian Serb artillery is routinely employed against civilian targets and populations.

Comments as for siege warfare apply, with two addendum. Trying to pick off artillery and mortars with air power is difficult at best. Either air power or counterbattery fire risks causing large civilian casualties as mortars are often emplaced in and near captured villages. This does not mean that air power should not be employed, but that it is unlikely to be decisive without a coordinated ground campaign.

In addition, bombardment of civilian populations has been associated with ethnic cleansing. While bombarding fleeing refugees clearly constitutes a war crime and linked to ethnic cleansing, accusing Bosnian Serbs of war crimes in trying to break the will of besieged civilians through artillery attack wanders perilously close to hypocrisy for the western military powers. The fire bombing of Dresden, the smashing of Hamburg, and other famous World War II exploits essentially applied the same logic for which the Serbs receive condemnation. More recently, during Operation Desert Storm the U.S. military terminated air attacks on Iraqi soldiers fleeing Kuwait City to avoid international repercussions. However, that decision almost certainly

reflected the impact of news coverage of the event more than concern that such attacks were barbaric.

Food and Shelter

A large portion of the Muslim population and smaller portions of the Serb and Croat populations have gone without the basic necessities of life. Harsh weather, lack of food, attacks by various armed entities, and constant forced relocations have contributed to the deaths of tens of thousands of Muslims. The continuing compression of Bosnian government territory will eventually make much of the Muslim population dependent on foreign charity to survive.

International relief efforts will be required to support the Bosnian Muslims for years. The current territory they occupy cannot feed the population; they are not producing any wealth with which to purchase food. Given the wealth and largesse of the Arab world, funding such an enormous task becomes conceivable. To implement any peace agreement, Izetbegovic must get more land as is provided for under the Vance-Owen concept.

Camps

Internment camps have been established by all sides. However conditions in several of the Serbian camps struck at least some in the international community as hauntingly similar to the German death camps of the Holocaust.

At the dedication of the Holocaust Memorial in April 1993, Elie Wiesel turned to President Clinton, told him that he (Wiesel) had been to Bosnia, and it was like the Holocaust. Wiesel then challenged President Clinton stop the horror in Bosnia; stop the shipping of people in box cars to camps.³⁷

All sides have violated POW's rights under the Geneva convention with the Bosnian Serbs again winning first prize. However, remedying the worst conditions has been an inexpensive way for all ethnic groups to seek better publicity; thus, this problem had declined in significance until Wiesel made it one again. Wiesel spoke of the camps, but truthfully was indicting the West for permitting all forms of ethnic cleansing.

This event demonstrated how an intervention force might find itself compelled to perform new or modified missions on the basis of media reporting of humanitarian concerns. The longer a military intervention force remained in Bosnia as the predominant international agency, the more non-combat assignments it will receive.

Refugees

Upwards of two million Bosnians are refugees. Most are Muslim. Many still remain in Bosnian controlled territory. The refugee burden on the surrounding nations and Germany is substantial and increasing. The continuing compression of Bosnian government territory will eventually

make much of the Muslim population dependent on foreign charity to survive.

The numbers are becoming staggering in Bosnia, a country of 4.3 million people in 1991. One in three Bosnians is a refugee.³⁸ The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees issued a report in December 1992. 35 percent or 1.3 million Bosnians became refugees early in the war. Estimates citing 2 million refugees did not appear until the end of 1992. Croatia and Serbia have at least 600,000 Bosnians within their borders.³⁹

While the world can absorb the Bosnian refugees if it must, as a practical solution it will not. The number of refugees from other places of conflict, who would press for similar treatment, would result in an economic disaster for many western nations. In actuality, the refugee crisis more than any other aspect of Bosnia's dilemma captures Europe's attention. Where ethnic cleansing incites a moral response, refugees inspire a pragmatic reaction. Western Europe simply cannot risk the expansion of the conflict; it cannot and does not want to pay for absorbing potentially millions of refugees from the Balkans. Keeping the Bosnian refugee problem under control mandates that the Bosnian government not lose the war and must recover more territory.

Land Mines

Bosnia now is a country full of emplaced land mines, perhaps a million of them. The most common victims are

civilians. Records of their emplacement do not appear to be maintained by any side. Mines have been employed for more than a military affect; fields and vacant homes are frequently sown with mines to keep refugees from returning.

Remedying this problem cannot even begin until the conflict has ceased. To limit their own and civilian casualties, foreign and Bosnian forces will require abnormally more mine countermeasures equipment and training given the multitude of different mine types wielded.

The Other Problems

It would unrealistic to expect one media source to discuss every aspect of a crisis as it develops over more than a year. The Monitor actually did a very credible job in following developments, but there are some less obvious aspects of the situation in Bosnia which merit discussion.

Profiteering

While wars normally provide economic benefits to the suppliers, the existence of a pervasive mafia conspiracy in Bosnia has rarely, if ever, been addressed in Western media. A revealing Croatian newspaper interview in February 1993 with the General Halilovic, Chief of the Bosnian Army General Staff, grudgingly acknowledged that operations on Mount Igman (10 or so kilometers outside Sarajevo) had problems.⁴⁰ A portion of that translated discussion is quoted below:

Interviewer: "Igman is a crucial point in all efforts to lift the blockade of Sarajevo. One gets the impression however, that things are not running smoothly over there. Why?"

Halilovic: "Time will show who is responsible for what! I personally know the truth. . . ."

Interviewer: "Why do you not come out with it?"

Halilovic: "Because the time is not right for baring all. Those imposing the blockade estimate that Igman is a crucial strategic from which a lifting of the blockade of the city can be undertaken and that is why it is necessary to thwart this at all costs."

Interviewer: "So who is doing this?"

Halilovic: "An assorted criminal-political mob. It is Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim. In Tuzla, they allow some things through, but here nothing gets through!"

Interviewer: "Why do they allow this in Tuzla and not in Sarajevo?"

Halilovic: "Because Sarajevo is a symbol of resistance and mutual existence. East meets West here and if the mutual existence of three peoples is possible here, then it is possible everywhere else. And if Sarajevo is under blockade, then the whole country is too."

Interviewer: "You believe that this reflects the interests of greater state policies [velikodrzavna

politika], but what Muslim element has an interest in keeping Sarajevo under blockade?"

Halilovic: "I have already told you, it is the mob element!"

Interviewer: "What social environment does it stem from, what are its interests and what is it called?"

Halilovic: "You know that better than I do!"

Interviewer: "Fine, let us assume that this is so. However, I believe that this mob-like, criminal element will one day undermine the people's noble struggle to defend the city and that it will become the model for a black, monstrous and dirty place, much like the Vienna of the 'Third Man', except that there they were running a black market in fake penicillin, whereas here it is in everything-flower [probably flour], ideology, human lives. . . ."

Halilovic: "Unfortunately, you could be right. That is why we have to lift the blockade of the city as soon as possible."

The ramifications of this interview are fourfold. A multi-ethnic mafia-like organization has a vested interest and ability to maintain the crisis atmosphere throughout Bosnia. The head of the Bosnian Army cannot even bring himself to name the organization, which apparently includes important Bosnian officials. This organization has sufficient influence to stop the military relief of Sarajevo. Many analysts wondered why the Muslim-Croat

military coalition had not raised the siege of Sarajevo in Summer 1992, when they appeared poised to do so. At that time, the military alliance still had meaning. Finally, yet another faction must be considered in the effort to resolve Bosnia's problems.

In a possibly related story, the Bosnian Army military police in Sarajevo were indicted in a wide variety of scandals to include murder, black-marketing, and miscellaneous mayhem. The 1st Battalion, 6th Hill Brigade, 1st Sarajevo Corps was named as one safe-haven for these criminals.⁴¹ On 13 February 1993, Izetbegovic mentioned turning the military police into a combat unit and transferring its military functions.⁴²

Additional effort to understand the bureaucracy that functions as the Bosnian government will be necessary in order to reach any definitive conclusions about its state of corruption, a task beyond the scope of this paper. Tentatively, an assumption that Izetbegovic's political power may be linked to this mafia-like organization should not be made, given his possible efforts to oppose the organization in Sarajevo described above.

Religious Institutions

The Monitor scarcely mentioned religious differences as a cause of the Bosnian conflict, while many academics and commentators have.⁴³ The reason for such confusion is the close identification between the Bosnian Muslims and the

Islamic faith. Simply because war is waged on an ethnic group, and a distinguishing characteristic of that ethnic group is its religion, does not mean that a religious war is the result. Some fighters on the Serb side have stated that they felt threatened by Islamic fundamentalism; therefore, the Muslims had to be fought.⁴⁴ However, Arab Islamic fundamentalists who volunteer to fight in Bosnia quickly find out that the Bosnian Muslims are just trying to save their homes, not wage holy war.⁴⁵

Despite Serbian political and informational efforts to cast the conflict as a religious war, perhaps to help convince the West not to intervene, Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarch Pavle does not seem to believe it. He has continuously worked with his Catholic and Muslim counterparts to condemn the violence and called on all parties to stop the bloodshed.⁴⁶ This attitude marks a strange divergence from history as every previous aggressive religious war in the former Yugoslavia was supported by key church leaders. Metaphorically, this would equate to the Catholic nobility of the Middle Ages launching a crusade without Papal blessing--it would not be a crusade.

However, for all the reasons to challenge the notion that the Bosnian conflict began as a religious war, many of the participants now perceive it to be so. Perhaps the decision by the leaders of all three churches involved to refuse to endorse the war as a religious crusade is all that

limits the religious motivations that abound. A period of peace offers at least the opportunity for each of the religious hierarchies to defuse the religious zeal now sustaining much of the violence.

Languages

Many unitarist and factional movements in the history of the South Slavs have begun with or inspired attempts to manipulate ethnic identification through the dialects of Serbo-Croatian spoken.⁴⁷ The resurgence of this concept in Bosnia threatens to generate three separate language standards in the cantons: Serbian, Croatian, and now Bosnian.⁴⁸ Since most cantons will have sizable ethnic minorities if the Vance-Owen plan is ever implemented, the basis for conflict over official languages should be neutralized by requiring all major dialects spoken in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be equally official in all cantons.

Solutions

The complexity of the Bosnian war is obvious. As the description of problems above connotes, certain causes and symptoms of the war either were not significant (i.e. religion) or have been resolved (i.e. air attacks on civilians). Synthesizing the remainder, four categories stand out as where any efforts at solution should focus.

Internal Borders--the War between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims

Without resolving this issue, the Bosnian Muslims

will be compressed into a virtual prison camp of an enclave or be absorbed into Croatia and Serbia. With the defeat of the Muslims, many of the symptoms will go away. Ethnic cleansing and the creation of more refugees will proceed apace. Conversely, ending this war will create the conditions to end the other wars in Bosnia.

Bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table in good faith will require a military threat which could reverse their current advantage, while offering the political guarantees discussed earlier. Such a threat could take a year to build if it means arming and training the Bosnian Muslims, even supported by foreign air power. Once the Muslims had such a capability, there is no reason to believe that they would not fully exploit it; therefore, trying to limit their military potential would be a necessary if difficult task in order to avoid the slaughter of the Bosnian Serbs. A foreign military intervention could create the conditions for the Muslims to slowly regain territory and serve as a much more controllable tool to bring the Bosnian Serbs to negotiation. Serbia's influence can be neutralized if necessary by destroying the bridges linking Serbia to Bosnia.

Bosnian Independence

The failure to preserve at least the rudiments of independent statehood for Bosnia will result in its eventual division between Croatia and Serbia. The federal or

confederal form of central authority will require thousands of foreign civilians and police to create and preserve until institutional legitimacy can be gained. A long-term requirement for foreign military forces on the order of a multinational division or more also exists.

Ethnic Cleansing

The failure to halt ethnic cleansing will not merely result in the break up of Bosnia, but dooms perhaps another million people. Many of the problems of Bosnia are directly tied to the ethnic cleansing campaign. Much of ethnic cleansing occurs behind the front lines. Solving this problem requires one of two solutions. A military intervention could create the political conditions to implement a Vance-Owen style peace plan. The U.N. could sponsor and fund a massive population redistribution in Bosnia under the terms of an armistice. However, such a redistribution would leave only a rump Muslim state.

Refugees

Resettling the refugees is a prerequisite to making a peace accord viable in the short-term. Further, the economic recovery of the region is inextricably linked to ending the refugee status of much of Bosnia's population. A negotiated political settlement is the only means to resolve this issue.

Conclusions

Addressing the problems of Bosnia requires a military intervention to conduct peace enforcement operations, almost certainly including a ground component. As discussed earlier in this chapter, any proposed military intervention in Bosnia carries the stigma of failure. Therefore, chapter four will investigate these perceptions of the hopeless character of a military intervention.

Endnotes

1. Glenny, 148.
2. See for instance these interviews with Mladic: Glenny, 26-29; Tanjug (Belgrade), 1 January 1993 in FBIS EEU-93-001 (4 January 1993): 59; AFP (Paris), 26 January 1993 in FBIS EEU-93-016 (27 January 1993): 1.
3. Bess Brown, Suzanne Crow, and Hal Kosiba, "Territorial Scuffles Over Bosnia and Hercegovina," RFE/RL 1, no. 40 (9 October 1992): 74 and Patrick Moore, "Issues in Croatian Politics," RFE/RL 1, no. 64 (6 November 1992): 9-12.
4. Andrejevich, "More Guns, Less Butter in Bosnia and Hercegovina," 12-15.
5. In Spring 1992, the elected leader of the HDZ in Bosnia, Stjepan Kljuic, was an ardent supporter of Bosnian independence. However, he was voted out of his party position for his refusal to accept the cantonization of Bosnia. Thompson, 332.
6. Patrick Moore, "The Widening Warfare in the Former Yugoslavia," RFE/RL 2, no. 1 (1 January 1993): 3-5.
7. A 5 February report in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung suggests that President Tudjman is indulging the local desires of Hercegovinan Croats to dominate or ethnically cleanse the indigenous Muslim population from Croatian held territory in Bosnia. His generals in Zagreb believe such a course alienates valuable allies in the Muslims and wrongly supports the partition of Bosnia along lines that leave Bosnian Serb areas more dangerous than might be. This argument makes sense in the context that a weak confederal Bosnian central government would permit Herceg-Bosna to be more independent as well. Tudjman is taking unwise and unnecessary risks. Patrick Moore, "Opposition to Tudjman in the Croatian Military?" RFE/RL Supplement, 2, no. 7 (1-5 February 1993): 18.
8. Glenny, 18-19.
9. Andrejevich, "Bosnia and Hercegovina Move toward Independence," 22-26.
10. Glenny, 149-150.
11. Belgrade Radio, 10 May 1991 cited in FBIS EEU-91-092 (13 May 1991): 56.

13. Glenny, 153.
14. Andrejevich, "Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Precarious Peace," 8-9.
15. See for example the compromise plan brokered in Lisbon on 22 and 23 February 1992. Suzanne Crow, Kathleen Mihalisko, and Vera Tolz, "Plan For Bosnia and Hercegovina," RFE/RL 1, no. 10 (6 March 1992): 77.
16. Nedjeljna Dalmacija (Split), 3 February 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-031 (18 February 1993): 50-53.
17. Thompson, 323-331 and Glenny, 143-144, 162-165.
18. Andrejevich, "Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Precarious Peace," 9.
19. Ibid., 7.
20. Singleton, 14.
21. Ibid., 19.
22. Ibid., 242.
23. Ibid., 19-20.
24. Ibid., 108-121.
25. Roger Cohen, "As Banker Flees, Yugoslavia Pays," New York Times, 21 March 1993, sec. A, p. 6.
26. Glenny, 150.
27. See for example the interview with General Zivota Panic, Chief of Staff of the new Yugoslav Army in Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 9 February 1993 as cited in FBIS EEU-93-027 (11 February 1993): 49-50; an article on Milosevic loyalists in the Yugoslav Army in Delo (Ljubljana), 23 December 1992 as cited in FBIS EEU-009-93 (14 January 1993): 51-53 and the latest on purges of the Yugoslav Army in Delo (Ljubljana), 7 December 1992 as cited in FBIS EEU-93-003 (6 January 1993): 38-39.
28. Glenny, 122-124 and Andrejevich, "Bosnia and Hercegovina: In Search of Peace," RFE/RL 1, no. 23 (5 June 1992): 1-11.
29. Jomini did an excellent job of defining the differences between civil wars, nationalist wars, wars of intervention and how to identify achievable military

objectives when they become intermingled. Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. W. P. Craighill and G. H. Mendell (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott & Co, 1862, repr., Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), 16-36.

30. Exceptions include Vreme, produced in Belgrade, Serbia and Slobodna Dalmacija, managed in Split, Croatia.

31. Robert Hayden, "Politics and the Media," RFE/RL 2, no. 49 (6 December 1991): 17-25.

32. 100,000 cited in "Massacre Reported in Bosnia," Kansas City Star, 3 March 1993, sec. A, pp. 1,9 and the 134,000 figure came from the Bosnian government in "Starving Refugees rush to receive food, medicine," Kansas City Star, 20 March 1993, sec. A, p. 9. If U.N. and U.S. estimates continue their previous relationship to official Bosnian government estimates, perhaps only 60,000 to 70,000 have died through March 1993.

33. While many factors contributed to the JNA failures to secure Croatia, a critical component seems to be the lack of any motivation on the part of a large number of Serb soldiers to kill Croatians or Serb civilians to answer the draft call to fight in Croatia. James Gow, "Military-Political Affiliations in the Yugoslav Conflict," RFE/RL 1, no. 20 (15 May 1992): 20.

34. Hal Kosiba, "International Developments in Bosnian Crisis," RFE/RL 1, no. 49 (11 December 1992): 65.

35. Ibid.

36. Muslim forces did once succeed in breaking the siege of Gorazde by launching a surprise offensive. While such a tactic could succeed again, the balance of forces is such that the Bosnian Serbs can regain control of the lines of communication around most of the besieged towns whenever they choose by employing their superior armor and mechanized units.

37. News Broadcast, National Public Radio, 22 April 1993.

38. Thompson, 314.

39. Iva Dominis and Ivo Bicanic, "Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Former Yugoslavia," RFE/RL 2, no. 3 (15 January 1993): 1-4.

40. This source represents one of the few newspapers in the former Yugoslavia which retains both its independence from the politicians and its quality of reporting. If most other media sources had reported this interview, its credibility would have been in serious doubt. Nedjeljna Dalmacija (Split), 3 February 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-031 (18 February 1993): 50-53.

41. Danas (Zagreb), 29 January 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-032 (19 February 1993): 36.

42. Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina (Sarajevo), 13 February 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-029 (16 February 1993): 42.

43. For example see Patrick Moore, "Islamic Aspects of the Yugoslav Crisis," 37-42.

44. Ibid., 38.

45. Patrick Moore, "The London Conference on the Bosnian Crisis," RFE/RL 1, no. 36 (11 September 1992): 4.

46. Tanjug (Belgrade), 26 November 1992 cited in FBIS EEU-92-230 (30 November 1992): 41.

47. Banac, 46-49.

48. Vecernji List (Zagreb), 16 January 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-018 (29 January 1993): 23.

CHAPTER 4

MYTHS AND REALITIES OF INTERVENTION

The discussions of military intervention contained in the Monitor, whether in general or specifically addressing the U.S., ran two to one for such action, reflecting the editorial predilection of the paper. Of more interest was the remarkable consistency with other editorials and treatises in discussing the problems of intervention. The difficulty in identifying political objectives or end-states for which military action would be appropriate was a common theme (General Powell's elaboration of this problem was discussed in Chapter One). Most hypothetical political objectives proposed as straw-men seemed to depend in part upon a successful military intervention. However, the majority of writers assumed this to be a nearly impossible task.

Military failure would occur for two reasons. First, the German experience in the Balkans in World War II demonstrated that enormous forces (numbers of up to 26 German divisions have been frequently used) engaged in a futile, even losing fight with partisan forces in Yugoslavia. Second, and buttressed to a great degree by the German World War II experience, injecting peacekeepers into

contemporary Bosnia would mean a huge occupation force which would be interminably engaged by all sides while it futilely attempted to bring peace to the region. The linkage between these two pieces of common wisdom can be seen in the following quotations.

According to LTG Barry R. McCaffrey, Assistant to General Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:

. . . field army of 400,000 troops would be needed to impose a cease-fire and occupy territory in the disputed areas of the Balkans...Its 60,000 to 100,000 to provide absolute security around Sarajevo [capitol of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and the road into it [200 miles of road to the Croatian port of Split].¹

And Edward Cowen, former British military attache to Yugoslavia stated:

It could take 100,000 to make the entire Muslim-occupied region [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] safe from attack.²

In a similar vein, Canadian MG Lewis MacKenzie, a U.N. Commander in Sarajevo Sector remarked:

. . . to send in a force large enough to pacify the entire nation, you are talking staggering numbers.³

David Hackworth, a Newsweek military expert, echoed:

Yugoslavia is an impossible mission. . . . Yugoslavian soldiers, irregular or regular, are the meanest mothers in the valley of death and the last tigers the United States ever wants to try to tame.⁴

Hackworth's comments seem supported by Fred Singleton, past Chairman of the Postgraduate School for Yugoslav Studies at the University of Bradford, who noted:

The ability of bands of ill-armed guerrillas to deny large area of the country [Yugoslavia] to the Germans and Italians, and to hold down thirty enemy divisions [December 1941] at a crucial period of the war, constitutes an epic in the annals of warfare.⁵

And Harry Levins, of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, summed it all up:

Armies enter the Balkans at their own peril. Despite stern talk among Washington's statesmen of a military response should the Serbs overstep themselves, military experts are speaking with a lot less starch in their voice. No wonder. The last army to head into that part of the Balkans was Germany's, in the spring of 1941. . . . As it turned out, overrunning Yugoslavia was the easy part. . . . Everything argued against pacification: nasty terrain, a warlike people and a bloody-minded history. Half a century later, nothing much has changed.⁶

When these ominous warnings are subjected to detailed examination, however, the situation becomes much less grim. The review of the German experience in Bosnia presented below strongly suggests that the strain on the Wehrmacht has been exaggerated by several orders of magnitude. The analysis of the contemporary military proposals which follows the World War II examination reveals that the difficulties predicted result from the presumed mission of military intervention forces; not the implacable foes. Change the mission statement and the military aspects become conceivable.

The German Experience in Bosnia during World War II

Huge armies, horrendous casualties, and an hopeless war--the debate concerning a possible foreign military

intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina spawns such talk.⁷ Harry Levins asserts that the German ordeal in the Balkans during the Second World War serves to restrain the enthusiasm of today's military planners for a peace-making operation in Bosnia.⁸ Advocates for restraint certainly exist.⁹ However, several actions could have eased the German effort and would likely ease a contemporary effort. Moreover, general statements about war in the Balkans obscure the actual German experience in Bosnia. In fact, Germany's commitment to Bosnia involved comparatively minor forces which achieved their major objectives with acceptable losses.

The Players

A quick identification of the powers involved is pertinent. During the invasion of the kingdom of Yugoslavia, German, Italian, Ustascha¹⁰, Hungarian and Bulgarian forces attacked the Royal Yugoslav Army. With the formal end to hostilities, a quasi-autonomous Croatia¹¹ nominally absorbed Bosnia and Hercegovina.¹² Croatian forces included the expanded Ustascha and the Domobrani, which equated roughly to the Nazi SS and regular German army respectively.¹³ In reality the Germans and Italians divided military responsibility for Bosnia in half along an axis running roughly from northwest to southeast.

Resistance to the occupation assumed many forms. "Chetnik"¹⁴ groups corresponded to a greater or lesser

degree with Serb forces which either supported the puppet Serbian government, the anti-communist Serb royalists, or Tito's partisans. Tito's partisans included a broad spectrum of organizations unified under his communist party and its associated military component.¹⁵ In addition, numerous splinter groups existed which served only to operate in their own villages and who answered to no one.

The Invasion

German intentions with regard to Yugoslavia changed rapidly in 1941. Securing the southern flank of the Balkans was imperative prior to launching the invasion of Russia.¹⁶ Maintaining peace in the south Balkans had been the plan until 4 November 1940, when Hitler decided that Mussolini's ill-timed, secretly launched attack on Greece had failed.¹⁷ Political accommodation with Yugoslavia, necessary for the German attack on Greece, failed with the overthrow of the regent, Prince Paul, and his government on 26 March 1941.¹⁸ Despite the new government's protestations of a willingness to act as a benevolent neutral, German planning to invade Yugoslavia commenced on 27 March with air attacks beginning on 6 April.¹⁹

Several concerns and objectives prompted the attack on Yugoslavia. First, the General Staff identified the Zagreb-Belgrade-Nis railway as essential to supporting the invasion of Greece.²⁰ Hitler believed the new Yugoslav government unreliable; it would eventually join the

allies.²¹ In fact, the coup had taken Hitler by surprise. Furious at this perceived insult, Hitler instructed Goring to level Belgrade.²²

Two significant points present themselves at this juncture. The German invasion plan was a crisis response, taking less than two weeks to plan, move forces, and execute.²³ Thus, little attention would be given to the post-conflict phase, beyond Hitler's disposal of territory to the participants and the rapid extraction of most forces for the invasion of Russia.²⁴ One effect of this shortsightedness would be the hundreds of thousands of soldiers and large quantity of munitions left unaccounted for after the armistice.²⁵

Also significant, Bosnia-Hercegovina had no strategic significance to the Balkan campaign. Thus, securing the urban centers and destroying the Yugoslav army were considered brief tasks. Allocation of Bosnia to Croatia confirmed the relative unimportance attached to this land. In short, Bosnia would offer the refuge that a nascent partisan required.

While these two lapses did not derail the subsequent German occupation of Bosnia, they did significantly assist in the establishment of Tito's movement. Once established, Tito's organization could survive its forced retreat from Bosnia.

The German assault into Bosnia, while benefiting from the confusion caused by its swift advance across the border, still faced elements of two Yugoslav army groups,²⁶ including five uncommitted infantry divisions.²⁷

On 12 April, The Germans launched drives from the west and east towards Sarajevo, the capitol of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Second Yugoslav Army Group headquarters attempted to coordinate a new defense line. In three days, the infantry had closed on Bosnia's western territory along the Una river. As the infantry secured river crossing sites, 14th Panzer Division, which had broken through the Una on the first day, approached Sarajevo.²⁸

From the northeast, First Panzer Group cleared areas up to Bosnia's boundaries along the Sava and Drina rivers, dedicating 8th Panzer division to the drive on Sarajevo. Two motorized infantry divisions supported 8th Panzer moving along the main roads from Zvornik and Uzice. 8th Panzer's success mimicked that of 14th Panzer. By 15 April, Sarajevo and Second Army Group had surrendered.²⁹

Thus, German conquest of Bosnia actually required only two panzer and two motorized divisions operating for four days. Holding a line of communication open in the west did not require the four infantry divisions employed, as they advanced against virtually no resistance.³⁰ One or two divisions would have sufficed.³¹ In the east, no significant assistance was needed for the twin thrusts.

German casualties for the entire Yugoslav campaign came to 558. Yugoslav losses in Bosnia are harder to estimate. Speed and surprise assisted the two motorized divisions in capturing at least 70,000 soldiers.³²

Clearly, the German invasion of Bosnia was cost-effective and equally decisive. Several reasons for this success existed. The dedicated German Fourth Air Force played an important role in supporting the spearheads and striking deep.³³ German armor and motor transport proved capable of moving through mountainous and muddy terrain as required. The armored thrusts moved along the major communications lines too quickly for the Yugoslav army to react.³⁴ The Yugoslav army, particularly in armor and aircraft, was obsolete. It lacked mobility and, in any event, began mobilizing too late.³⁵ Finally, fighting among Serbian and Croatian army units, mainly in the Sarajevo and Mostar areas, limited the formation of significant reserves.³⁶

The Occupation

Evaluating the effectiveness of the Yugoslav resistance mandates special considerations. The Partisans' ability to materially affect the Reich's objectives in Yugoslavia and the Balkans had been a subject left to Yugoslav historians and members of the Allied Special Operations Executive (SOE) charged with enhancing the usefulness of the Yugoslav resistance.³⁷ Many respected

works employ these sources as authoritative, since they mutually support one another.³⁸ Recent, more objective, research substantiates two points. First, assertions that 600,000 Germans, twenty-six German divisions, and up to thirty-eight total Axis divisions sat in Yugoslavia are wildly exaggerated.³⁹ Second, the Partisan movement did not significantly hamper German operations until the Soviets and Bulgarians opened a conventional front in Yugoslavia in 1944.⁴⁰

Turning then to German operations in Bosnia, the objectives appear to have been to secure the local military lines of communication and assure the security of the main rail line paralleling the northern border of Bosnia. Aided by the Sava river, Italian forces and Croatian formations, German forces generally achieved these objectives at minimal cost.⁴¹

For instance, the German occupation force in Bosnia, through 1941, consisted of only the 718th infantry division (with only 2 regiments) and smaller independent SS detachments.⁴² The partisan movement did expand in Bosnia during 1941, but south of the German zone of influence.

In January 1942, the Germans coordinated a response to the guerrilla forces operating in the Italian zone. Targeting a 4,000 man force operating between Visegrad and Sarajevo, two German divisions killed 521 guerrillas, captured 1331 more and would have annihilated the remainder

if Italian forces had secured their blocking positions on time. The Germans suffered 156 casualties.⁴³ A similar operation in west Bosnia took place in June 1942, with equal success.⁴⁴

By early 1944, Tito's forces had reoccupied the west Bosnian mountains as a refuge following Italy's withdrawal from the area and the war. Operation ROESSELSPRUNG, launched in May 1944, sought to neutralize Tito's Partisan organization. Bringing in the 1st Mountain division, an SS infantry regiment, a tank battalion and a parachute battalion, plus some Croatian units, the attack nearly captured Tito. Two Partisan divisions were decimated. The command and control center of Tito's organization fell and with virtually all its equipment was captured. While the British reestablished Tito on the coastal island of Vis, Partisan power in Bosnia had been broken.⁴⁵

By August 1944, with Italy out of the war, the German occupation of Bosnia reached its zenith. German forces located in Bosnia had risen to the 1st Cossack division (non-German), 7th SS Mountain division (Ethnic Germans from central Europe), and the 369th and 373d infantry divisions.⁴⁶ With rare exception the bulk of German soldiers in Bosnia represented those too old or too ill to fight on the primary fronts. Still, the Germans found that as long as command and control was centralized, they retained the ability to impose their will in Bosnia at

minimal cost.⁴⁷ The Soviet offensive from Romania in September effectively ended the occupation of the Balkans.

Conclusions

While much more could be said about the German military experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the evidence indicates that the Germans committed minimal forces, suffered acceptable losses, and achieved their objectives. Better post-conflict planning could have simplified the German occupation. The repressive nature of German occupation and Croatian ustascha excesses, while not examined here, almost ensured that the pacification effort would never end.⁴⁸ Still, the German invasion and occupation of Bosnia in the Second World War suggests that today's military planners should find more positive than negative factors from their study of the historical data.

The German military experience in the Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated the success that heavy forces could enjoy despite the rugged terrain and relatively (to the Germans of 1941) limited transportation infrastructure. Where the German's technical superiority in combat systems, tactical air support in an air supremacy environment, greater speed and mobility, and mixed light and heavy forces were brought to bear, they achieved success. And even with up to 25 metric ton combat vehicles, the Germans found that secondary roads with steep grades did not prohibit the use of heavy forces in battalion or company strength.

The Germans also realized that partisan operations could achieve significant success only when secure areas were available to sustain, administer, and mass partisan forces. Secure areas were reduced by the Germans several times through establishing control of the roads, bridges and fords. Partisan forces had two choices, fight for the roads or fight their way out. While local partisan units could scatter and remain, these areas could not absorb the dispersion of the active field forces.

The Germans also found that disease and fatigue created more casualties than bullets. This can be attributed to the older age groups allocated to most German forces in the occupation, in combination with the affects of geography and climate during combat operations

The German plan for civil-military operations did not focus on any long-term strategy, but rather on transferring occupation tasks to allies, foreign troops, and quislings. The Germans essentially met their limited objectives in spite of the planning failure, but it made their task much more difficult than it needed to be. Worse, the Germans assumed responsibility for not only their own heinous acts but also their allies' campaigns of terror directed against Serbs, Jews, and others. This failing was the single most destabilizing factor to the German occupation. Propaganda usage and concern for the economic impact on people's day to day existence should have been

important to the German planners, but Hitler's own policies condemned any such efforts to failure in Bosnia.

Finally, the German experience in coalition operations revealed how dysfunctional they become when coalition forces operate on different levels of expertise. Italian blocking forces failed to reach their objectives time and time again as part of coordinated operations with the Germans.

There are distinct elements to the German experience in the Balkans that defy application to a contemporary scenario. The Germans executed many thousands of Yugoslav civilians in retribution for German casualties inflicted by armed resistance fighters. Obviously such counterproductive practices will not be tolerated in western military operations. However, as the analysis moves on to today's Bosnian battlefields, many of the tactical and operational lessons of the German experience do retain utility.

Contemporary Perceptions of an Intervention in Bosnia

When serious discussions began in the public forum, military officials from the U.S. and elsewhere were quick to point out the probable unsatisfactory results, even failure. Major General Lewis MacKenzie, U.N. commander of the Sarajevo Sector until July 1992: "If you send a force in large enough to pacify the entire nation, you are talking about staggering numbers." Identifying the combatants would be hellish because "you've got a bunch of warlords and thugs

and bandits, in addition to the established military forces on the three sides of the conflict".⁴⁹ LTG McCaffrey gave similar views in testimony on 11 August 1992 to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he noted that there are no clear military objectives and any intervention would certainly have large numbers of casualties. Also, overhead reconnaissance is ineffectual due to the heavily forested and mountainous terrain, as well as the intermingled populations. Some 19 separate warlords with several hundred to several thousand combatants filled Bosnia.⁵⁰

Speaking of the smallest military intervention task proposed, Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey gave a rough estimate of 60,000 to 120,000 troops to provide a 20 mile clear strip around Sarajevo airport (to prevent it from being hit by mortar and artillery fire) and a 200 mile land corridor from Split in Croatia.⁵¹ Even for this task, General MacKenzie cautioned, Americans getting killed on the ground was an invitation to escalation. He warned that you cannot make it nice and neat by just dealing with the camps and humanitarian aid. Also, he noted, the threat of force to get humanitarian aid through risked a deeper military involvement. The Bosnian Muslims would certainly be more determined to resist any compromise.⁵²

This last comment reaches to the heart of the matter. Izetbegovic's Muslims had not conquered any

territory, but they might be unwilling to compromise? Failing identifiable military objectives, any military intervention would be a peacekeeping, not peace enforcement, mission. Translated, that means any peace to keep would could only come about from the losing side, because the winning side had no reason to accept peace. In such circumstances, threats to hostages, threats to ethnically cleanse an area unless conditions were met, ambushes of peacekeepers or humanitarian relief columns in and from civilian areas, and intensive efforts to put blame for it all on other side, would conspire to destroy the peacekeeping effort.

However, as General MacKenzie stated in a 3 May 1993 interview on CNN, while the U.S. probably should not participate in peacekeeping, for perhaps the first time he talked about U.S. "peacemaking" (in the meaning of peace enforcement) capability as a different option all together. Given the unique strategic lift and military capabilities of the U.S., MacKenzie offered that if the U.S. were to propose a ground, not just air peace enforcement mission, such an operation would be well worth considering.

In fact, enough time has elapsed that identifying military objectives that might support a political resolution to the conflict can and should be attempted. As understanding about Bosnia's problems proliferates, the possibility to act effectively in Bosnia likewise improves.

An additional consideration is, of course, the possible military threats on the ground, formidable against peacekeepers attempting to maintain their objectivity in an essentially passive military mission. But when these same forces are considered as opposition to a peace enforcement operation, much of the threat becomes mere hyperbole.

The Military Forces of Bosnia

Forces operating in Bosnia belong to one of three sides. The Bosnian Territorial Defense Force (TDF) or Bosnian Army is the recognized government's forces and are predominantly Muslims. The Croatian Defense Council, nominally allied with the Bosnian Army, represents essentially regular military forces of the Bosnian Croats, who are organized, trained, and augmented by the Croatian Army. The Serbian Army of Bosnia and Hercegovina combines the Bosnian Serb irregular forces, former Yugoslav army forces, and theoretically a collection of local militias and external paramilitaries.

With some exceptions, the Croatian Defense Council exercises effective command and control over its dispersed forces. The Bosnian Muslim army exercises similar control sporadically, with different districts essentially fighting their own battles. Control seems to correlate with the amount and frequency with which equipment and logistics support are provided by the central command in Sarajevo.

The Bosnian Serb general staff's influence originated from similar pragmatic methods and a sense of common purpose, however by the end of 1992 the corps had begun to associate with the needs of the Serb Autonomous Region (SAO) they lived in, rather than the needs of the general staff in Bosnia.

As the following analysis demonstrates, the battlefield success of the Bosnian Serb's rests with the 5,000 to 10,000 soldiers who make up the effective regular combat forces of each corps. Given armor and artillery superiority, these forces have dominated the lines of communication, permitting sieges to be conducted by the less capable regular forces, reservists, and militias. The effective forces are not particularly well-equipped from a Western viewpoint, possessing no more than 100-250 armored fighting vehicles (per corps). Their primary means of moving infantry is the truck. They employ fairly small numbers of artillery while advancing, bringing up much more only after an operational or tactical pause occurs.

Destruction of these forces would not roll back the Serbian lines immediately. The Bosnian government would have to acquire a similar offensive capability or be assisted by an outside force to take back control of lines of communication; therefore, more territory. Facing a superior Western-led offensive force, a given Bosnian Serb corps would have to fall back on its central facilities.

Presumably other existing stockpiles would sustain a perimeter defense against any exclusively Bosnian Muslim infantry advances. However, as the Bosnian Muslims discovered, isolation from other portions of the existing logistics system, provided for under the total national defense concept, very quickly limits the ability to generate combat power. In particular, the key Bosnian Serb formations cannot run into the hills for very long without giving up the equipment and infrastructure that makes them so dominant. Even alternate logistics nodes are on important lines of communication; therefore, if you control the roads you control the logistics.

Under these conditions, the issue becomes what further offensive action should take place and by whom. Offensive action by the Bosnian government should focus on consolidating additional territory in the Bosnian Serb corps areas which have had their critical elements eliminated. It makes sense to provide the Bosnian Muslim's with a very limited heavy force capability estimated to provide them an advantage only against the Bosnian Serb corps who have lost their key heavy units. The western intervention force should retain the mission and capability to create the conditions for the Bosnian TDF to succeed. If necessary, the process can be repeated for each Bosnian Serb corps. When the conflict is terminated, equipment parity must be established prior to the departure of the western forces.

Of course, attempted intervention by the Yugoslav Army must be considered. Control or destruction of the small number of bridges which cross the Sava and Drina rivers effectively isolates the battlefield. The land routes from Montenegro and South Serbia which are available run through constricted, rugged terrain with little natural cover for wheeled or tracked vehicles. In short, western air forces could effectively block any militarily significant intervention by Serbia.

Croatia is the intervention force of greatest concern, although indirectly. It would certainly be tempting for President Tudjman to take advantage of western military intervention in Bosnia to retake some or all of the Serb held regions of Croatia. Clearly this is undesirable. And unless Tudjman is prepared to guarantee the Serbs some degree of autonomy and protection, there is no reason for the Croatian Serbs to capitulate without a bloodbath. This suggests that significant diplomatic, informational and economic pressure be applied by the EC or U.N. to both secure those guarantees prior to operations beginning in Bosnia and deter any Croatian offensive. To motivate the Croatian Serbs, they need to understand that the pressure being applied on Tudjman will decrease following the conclusion of operations in Bosnia. This proposed solution is not neat and assumes some risks. However, Tudjman would know that he could not politically survive sanctions similar

to those imposed on Milosevic; the Croatian Serbs understand that a western intervention in Bosnia makes their defensive situation precarious.

Therefore, a western intervention in support of the Bosnian government would not be doomed to endless years of combat to achieve the military objectives identified. The same tactical and technical superiority the Germans evinced against the Royal Yugoslav Army, could be generated by the major western powers against the Bosnian Serbs. The guerrilla threat would be diluted by the fact that the majority of the population, some 60 percent, constitutes not an antagonist, but an ally in 1993. Further, while the Bosnian Army is weak in combat power it is stronger than the Bosnian Serb forces in manpower.

Irregular military forces divide into four categories: paramilitaries, local militias, Partisan brigades and divisions, and foreign mercenaries. The following is a description of a local town militia. Bosanski Novi is located in northern Bosnia. A local Serb mafia known as the "Spare Ribs" donned uniforms and became the mayor's shock troops. They blew up all the mosques with anti-tank weapons. Muslim shops and cafes were blown up daily. Muslims corpses were found floating in the river. An outlying suburb was shelled and later burned. Military police rounded up Muslims for questioning and beatings; prior to having the U.N. ship them out. Serb forces told

U.N. official that they must assist in the transportation arrangements for Muslims (ethnic cleansing) or accept responsibility for what would follow. The local town council sold exit visas in return for rights to Muslim property. Local Serb townspeople were drawn into acts of violence, by coercion if necessary. Lots of goods became available for cheap prices to the remaining Serbs.⁵³

These militias are not combat forces. They could be called paramilitaries, but that term will be used to describe only those forces which are associated with political parties. The Bosnian Croat paramilitary formation HOS no longer merits the designation of a paramilitary force, having become about as regular as the Bosnian Army.

While all sides have paramilitaries, the Serbian sponsored organizations have had more exposure and notoriety. Total armed paramilitaries from Serbia for all groups able to operate in Bosnia appear to number from 2,000-4,000. Vojislav Seselj, leader of the ultra-nationalist Radical Party of Serbia and a member of the Serbian parliament, sponsors several paramilitary groups in the name of ethnic cleansing. His umbrella organization is known as the Serbian Chetnik Movement, one of many politically sponsored Serbian paramilitary organizations which grew out of the war with Croatia. Also known as the Red Duke, on Belgrade television he said, "We are perfecting the art of killing with a rusty shoehorn so that it will be

impossible to determine whether the victim was butchered or died of tetanus." His party received 27 percent of the vote in the Serbian parliamentary elections of December 1992.⁵⁴

Seselj has reportedly taken Captain Arkan under his wing, demonstrating Seselj's success in coopting the Serbian Volunteer Guard. Captain Arkan is wanted in Sweden for shooting his way out of a court where he was standing trial. He runs a pastry shop and restaurant in Belgrade.⁵⁵ His real name is Zeljko Raznjatovic. He brought trained and equipped small units into the war in eastern Croatia at a time when conventional assault troops were scarce in Yugoslav Army units.⁵⁶

Another notorious personality reputedly coming under Seselj's sway is Captain Dragan. He owns a legitimate business in Belgrade and now lends money to home owners. Half Australian and with a reputation as a mercenary, his monetary aims appear to equal or exceed his nationalist goals.⁵⁷ Seselj has not only superseded the paramilitary forces of the other political parties in importance, but has redirected almost exclusively to the task of ethnic cleansing in Serb occupied territory in Bosnia and Croatia. While a few of the very small extremist paramilitaries continue to go to the front lines, the most successful have essentially changed occupations.

The Partisan units have also evolved. Originally intended to assume local missions, the lack of reservists to

fill out regular and reserve units created a need to incorporate these local brigades into the active force structure for offensive operations. It also eased the logistics burden on the corps, but the more important benefits were in centralized command and control.

The final category of irregulars would be the mercenaries and foreign volunteers. Russians, Poles, Mojahedin, and many from western nations have come to Bosnia. The international brigade of foreign volunteers fighting Serbs near Bosanski Brod in northern Bosnia with Croat forces is typical. They tend to be used fill gaps in the lines or augment other front line troops.⁵⁸ They are not a militarily significant presence. However, the presence of both Russians and Mojahedin holy warriors provides exploitable propaganda for all sides to use.

The Armies of Bosnia

Establishing some reasonable figures for the significant military forces in Bosnia as of August 1992, the U.S. Joint Chiefs estimate to Congress identified some five major military groups: the Bosnian Serb Army with 35,000 troops, 600 artillery pieces, 300 tanks; Bosnian Serb Irregulars with 35,000 men with small arms and mortars with poor command and control capability; Bosnian Muslim Defense Forces with 50,000 troops with small arms and limited numbers of captured JNA armor and artillery; Bosnian Croat Regulars with 35,000 troops fairly well organized with tanks

and artillery; Bosnia Croat Irregulars (HOS) with up to 15,000 troops in irregular units with tanks, artillery and mortars in north and central Bosnia and eastern Hercegovina.

The Joint Staff estimate warrants some updating and further exploration given how much significance has been attributed to the capabilities of these forces. By 1993, two of the five military forces with any offensive capability had pretty much been amalgamated into the other three. The HOS forces in Bosnia were generally allied with Bosnian regulars or absorbed into the Bosnian Croat regulars. Similarly, the Bosnian Serb irregulars of consequence were incorporated into the regular force.⁵⁹ Thus, we have three major combatants. The most important, for reasons addressed earlier, are the Bosnian Serb forces. The Bosnian Muslim force data is provided for comparison.

The Bosnian Serb Army

The issues of how many and who controls former JNA soldiers left in Bosnia has been contentious. On 4 May 1992, Belgrade announced that any Serbian/Montenegrin citizens on military duty in Bosnia-Hercegovina would be withdrawn in 15 days. On 6 May, Belgrade claimed it had no basis for further federal control over army units in Bosnia-Hercegovina.⁶⁰ James Gow has cited the Yugoslav government claim of 50,000-60,000 personnel left behind by the JNA in Bosnia-Hercegovina, although pointing out that close contacts remained to the new Yugoslav Army which continued

to support Bosnian Serb military operations.⁶¹ The actual JNA statement declared that 80 percent of the 70,000 soldiers in Bosnia were Bosnians and most of those Serbs.⁶² However, as of May 1992, Milan Vego stated he had learned that closer to 95,000 troops were deployed in Bosnia. He also notes a separate report which independently concluded that 68% of the federal army (about 140,000) was deployed in Bosnia in April 1992. About 14,000 soldiers were withdrawn by the end of May to new Yugoslavia; therefore, Vego concluded that left about 80,000 to transfer to the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina.⁶³ Additional sources support Vego's estimates.⁶⁴

Yugoslav President Cosic's stated on 15 July 1992 that the Federal Army (nominally responsible to him, but by now largely under Milosevic's control) had not provided any weapons or military equipment to the Bosnian Serb TDF, nor command and control those forces, since the May withdrawal. However even in July, the operational chain of command from the General Staff in Belgrade included the "Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina." The Yugoslav General Staff continues to provide planning as well as weapons, equipment and ammunition. Indeed, some commanders were assigned, promoted or dismissed by Belgrade.⁶⁵

This does not mean that the commander of the Bosnian Serbs, General Ratko Mladic, is irrelevant. Transferred

from the Knin Corps in Croatia to lead the Serbian army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, Mladic's personal connections to the two corps in western Bosnia make him the one known commander whose influence extends beyond his immediate geographic location.⁶⁶ Mladic is having the time of his life; left to his own devices, would continue to wage war ruthlessly on Muslims or Croats.⁶⁷ He admitted his greatest concern was his chronic lack of professional soldiers, a concern born out in the analysis of his forces. He certainly does not control all the local warlords to be found in many towns and villages, nor the paramilitary "volunteers."⁶⁸

Morale and training in the Bosnian Serb Army are generally poor. Weaknesses exist in leadership at the junior officer and NCO levels, due to limited numbers if nothing else. Of 80,000 former JNA troops only about 35,000 are considered an effective military force.⁶⁹ Several factors have contributed to such a low number of effective troops. Many of these 80,000 soldiers arrived in Bosnia from Slovenia and Croatia with little desire to repeat those experiences. In addition, many of these soldiers were reservists called to active duty only in time for action in Croatia.

As of 15 July 1992, President Cosic claimed the Bosnian Serbs had 300 tanks, 231 guns, 25 combat aircraft and trainers, 20 helicopters, 4 SAM battalions. Acting

Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff, Zivota Panic, stated in a confidential speech that defended the adequacy of the federal army's support of Bosnian Serbs that they had acquired 900 tanks and armored vehicles, 852 guns and multiple rocket launchers, and 48 aircraft. Croatian estimates are that the Bosnian Serbs possess 350 T54/T55/M84 tanks, more than 200 armored personnel carriers, 1000 field guns (76mm through 155mm), 800 recoilless guns (82mm and 105mm) and 1200 mortars (82mm and 120mm), and domestically produced 128mm multiple rocket launchers (MRL) called Oganj and Plamen as well as a small number of 262mm Orkan MRL with a range up to 50 km. Air defense capabilities of the Bosnian Serbs include limited numbers of SA-2/3/6/9 launchers, a few radar controlled antiaircraft batteries, such as Swedish L70 40mm battery around Banja Luka's main airbase. Large numbers of 20mm and 30mm multibarrel antiaircraft guns are in the field, but without radar control. Large numbers of SA-7 shoulder fired missiles are also in the field.⁷⁰

The old JNA corps structure transferred with some modifications to the Bosnian Serbs. Lines of communication across the eastern border into Bosnia bring fuel, special equipment, and more. The Bosnian Serbs highly dependent on these lines which cross the Sava and Drina rivers at five points, plus an overland route from Montenegro, which is inefficient due to the terrain, but necessary to use. The

corps in western Bosnia are dependent on a narrow northern corridor linking the northern most crossing points with Banja Luka. At least two additional routes are likely used out of western Montenegro to support corps entities and the SAO in Eastern Hercegovina.⁷¹

Bosnian Serb Forces command, control and communications run from Han Pijesak, along a major line of communications from Bralinac to Sarajevo. The government seat is in Pale, outside Sarajevo, which has the IV East Bosnian Corps. The III North Bosnian Corps is in northeastern corner of Bosnia at Bijeljina. In western Bosnia are the I Krajina Corps at Banja Luka, reported to be the strongest corps with up to 30 percent of the equipment, and the II Krajina Corps at Drvar, plus the Knin Operational Group headquarters, which had to redeploy out of Croatia when U.N. peacekeepers came in. Finally, two additional entities in eastern Hercegovina which may not be under the control of General Mladic are the Hercegovina Corps at Bileca and a forward headquarters of the Uzice Corps at Nevesinje, linked to Yugoslav Army corps headquarters in Montenegro and Serbia respectively. The Uzice headquarters may have left. In August of 1992, the Hercegovina Corps was commanded by a Colonel, suggesting the Corps was reorganizing. By late 1992, it was clear that a Corps headquarters was operating east of Mostar.⁷² Appendix B contains a brigade order of battle for the Bosnian Serbs.

The Bosnian Government Army⁷³

As of January 1993, the Bosnian Territorial Defense Forces included 80,000 men of whom perhaps 44,000 were fully armed. The chain of command begins in Sarajevo, with Colonel Safir Halilovic (a Muslim) and Colonel Stjepan Siber (A Croat) coordinating the war effort. The Serb member of the Defense Forces, Colonel Jovan Divijak was arrested for allegedly smuggling arms to Serb citizens in Sarajevo. Primary weapon systems are anti-tank rocket launchers, such as the 90mm M79 Osa and 120mm Zolja, and mortars, mostly 62mm to 82mm with some 120mm. Bosnian Muslims have only a handful of tanks and armored personnel carriers.

District staffs exist in seven of the larger cities with an additional 23 staffs in other municipalities. Five corps and 30-33 brigades exist although many of these brigades are mere battalions. Larger brigades have 1000-1500 personnel.

A joint Croatian Defense Council (CDC) and Army of Bosnia and Hercegovina command was established in November 1992, but has largely collapsed. The CDC represents Bosnian Croat formations organized by the Croatian Army. At one time, up to six Bosnian Croat brigades were subordinate to the TDF II Corps in northern Bosnia. Bosnian Croatian HOS paramilitary forces still cooperate with Bosnian Muslim Forces, particularly in central Bosnia and western Hercegovina, to oppose CDC units in their attempt to assume

total control over previously jointly administered territory. Appendix B contains additional order of battle information on the Army of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

The Bosnian Croat Army

Trying to gather specific data on the Bosnian Croat forces from unclassified sources has been difficult, due primarily to the presence of Croatian National Guard units among them throughout much of the war. The Bosnian Croat forces come under a command structure called the Croatian Defense Council (HVO).

The HVO probably has 35,000 soldiers organized into 15-25 brigades. The large difference in the estimate of HVO brigades reflects a conclusion that up to 10 HVO brigades are actually part HVO and part Croatian National Guard. At times between 15,000 and 30,000 Croatian soldiers augment the HVO, bringing its field strength to 30 brigades. Roughly one third of the force operates in the Posavina region of north Bosnia.⁷⁴ Appendix B contains some minor additional information.

Conclusions

The point of comparison is that both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government forces are fairly well matched, excepting heavy weapons, logistics, and command and control facilities. From the standpoint of intervention, they are both fairly small as well. Bosnian Serb equipment is a

mixed bag of the modern and antique, perfectly deadly against the Muslims and Croats, but nearly worthless against a Western military force.

Bosnian Croat forces have resolved themselves to controlling their assigned territory under the Vance-Owen plan. That said, any secure sea line of communication would have to pass through Croatia and Bosnian Croat territory. Having to fight to establish a lodgement would not only vastly increase the magnitude of the conflict, but must be considered politically unacceptable.

Ideally, access to the port of Croatian port of Ploce would minimize Croatian control over the lines of communication once established, as Bosnian territory begins within a few kilometers. It is for the reason, as well as political realities, that launching and sustaining a military intervention in Bosnia should not initially use the port of Split or the rail lines from Europe through Croatia.

Endnotes

1. Michael Gordon, "60,000 Needed for Bosnia, A U.S. General Estimates," New York Times, 12 August 1992, sec. A, p. 8.
2. Craig Whitney, "What Price Bosnia?" New York Times, 10 August 1992, sec. A, p. 8.
3. "Jane's Interview," Jane's Defense Weekly, 19 September 1992, 48.
4. Comments cited by John Muravchik, "The Strange Debate Over Bosnia," Commentary, November 1992, 36.
5. Singleton, 86. Singleton's source for the thirty enemy divisions data is Yugoslavia in the Second World War (Belgrade, 1967). Specifically, the Yugoslavian chroniclers reported sixteen Italian, six German, two Bulgarian, and six Croat (Domobrani) divisions were engaged.
6. Harry Levins, "The military is wary of a war in the Balkans," Kansas City Star, 10 January 1993, sec. J, pp. 1, 5. The article summarizes the author's conversations with military analysts Harry Summers and Ronald Hatchett. Also includes the author's interpretation of the work of historian James Stokesbury regarding the German experience in Yugoslavia.
7. With the exception of Fred Singleton's comment, the quotations presented above came from discussion of the potential for foreign military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
8. See note 6, above.
9. See notes 1-4 and 6, above.
10. Singleton, 77-78. The ustascha were Croatian militants, led by Ante Pavelic, who received succor from Italy and Hungary in their efforts to overthrow the Yugoslav government in the 1930's. King Alexander had focused on nationalist groups as well as communists in his campaign to suppress political opposition. Ustascha forces accompanied the German and Italian invasion forces.
11. Singleton, 86-88. The Independent State of Croatia (NDH) came into being on 12 April 1941, only two days after the Germans marched into Zagreb. Under Ante Pavelic, the state formed contained only about fifty percent Croats, with two million Serbs, three-quarters of million Muslims, and a half million other minorities. Up to 350,000

12. Singleton, 76-79, 87-89. Bosnia-Hercegovina did not exist as a province in Spring 1941, when the invasion occurred. King Alexander had reorganized the internal boundaries of the kingdom in 1929 to minimize legitimate national and ethnic political organizations in the government. The largest Croatian political organization, under the leadership of Dr Macek, received two of these banovine (districts) to form a semi-autonomous state in 1939 in return for uniting behind young Prince Paul. This rump Croatia included those portions of south central Bosnia with Croatian majorities. Despite periodic Croatian and Serbian pretensions to the contrary, Bosnia-Hercegovina has retained an individual identity since the Ottoman invasions primarily because of the Slavic-speaking Muslim population associated with it. Thus, discussion of events occurring in Bosnia during World War II is valid no matter the lines temporarily drawn on the map.

13. Singleton, 89.

14. Singleton, pp. 88 and 98. Chetnik described both a post World War One Serbian veterans' organization and a type of military company. The reference to the military company also included Serbian irregular forces which had struggled against Turkish occupation.

15. Singleton, 86. The actual title of the umbrella organization was "National Liberation Anti-Fascist Front."

16. Center for Military History Publication 104-4, The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941) (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1953, repr., 1986), 3-4. Hereafter cited as CMH 104-4.

17. Ibid., 4.

18. Ibid., 20-21.

19. Ibid., 22, 49.

20. Ibid., 20.

21. Ibid., 22.

22. William Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Crest, 1960), 1083, 1085-1086. Hitler referred to the bombing of Belgrade as "Operation Punishment."

23. CMH 104-4, 25. A Yugoslav invasion had not been anticipated by the Germans prior to the issuance of Directive 25 on 27 March 1941.

24. Ibid., 149.

25. John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 492.

26. CMH 104-4, 37.

27. Ibid., 36-37.

28. Ibid., 61-63 and map 4.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 61.

31. United States Military Academy (USMA), The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean - Volume I Department of History (West Point, NY: USMA, 1978), 198. According to Marshal Kesselring, eight of twelve German divisions used in the invasion of Yugoslavia hardly saw action.

32. CMH 104-4, 63-64. German losses were 151 killed, 392 wounded and 15 missing in action. For the entire campaign, the Germans took over 254,000 prisoners. This accounted for only about one quarter of the fully mobilized Yugoslav army.

33. Ibid., 61, 63.

34. Keegan, 155 and CMH 104-4, 66.

35. Keegan, 154-155 and CMH-104-4, 66-68.

36. CMH 104-4, 61-63, 68-69.

37. Keegan, 494-495.

38. See for instance Singleton, 86, 97; Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans - Vol II (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 266-271 and Department of the Army (DA), Yugoslavia: A Country Study, DA Pam 550-99 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1992), 39-41, 230-231 (hereafter cited as DA Pam 550-99).

39. See for example Muravchik, 36 and Keegan, 494-495. Muravchik cites historian Norman Stone's article in the London Times, where he stated that the German Military-

Historical Research Office records showed six German divisions, two of which were manned by Croats, of which only one was of front-line caliber. Similarly, Keegan cites six divisions, expanded to thirteen following the collapse of Italy. Only 1st Mountain division was first class. Of the remainder, at least five were manned by ethnic Germans from central Europe and local ethnic minorities (Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Albanians). The extravagant numbers listed elsewhere would seem to include all Axis forces in the Balkans, including Crete, Bulgaria, and Romania. The "justification" for such accounting might be found in the location of Army Group F and the Southeast Theater command in Belgrade. Since these headquarters controlled all German forces in the Balkans, total forces under their command did in fact approach 700,000 men and 20 divisions as in Center for Military History Publication 104-18, German Antiquerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1954, repr., 1989), 49-51, hereafter cited as CMH 104-18.

40. See Keegan, 495-496; Muravchik, 36 and Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York, NY: Avon, 1970), 409-411, 515. Speer indicates that the Balkans primary importance to German industry was as a conduit for Turkish chromium. Keegan notes the German objectives for occupation meant securing the lines of communication south to Greece and certain important ore production, such as copper from Serbia. Until the Russians opened a conventional front via Romania and Bulgaria, the Germans succeeded in meeting these objectives.

41. CMH 104-18, 20-27, 36-38, 40-43, 44-45, 47-52, and 64-66. In short, communist success in Bosnia were almost exclusively against the Italians, in their southern zone of influence, or against Croatian forces. The Partisans never threatened to endanger the German position in Bosnia. The narrative of Milovan Djilas, a senior leader of Tito's Partisans during and immediately after the war, supports this conclusion in both text and tone. See his book Wartime (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1977).

42. CMH 104-18, 16-17.

43. Ibid., 24-25.

44. Ibid., 26.

45. Ibid., 65-66 and map 4.

46. Ibid., 65 and map 4.

47. Ibid., 76-77.
48. German military officials in Yugoslavia and Tito's Partisans nearly worked out an armistice in 1942. Djilas, 229-245. Once Hitler and the Nazi regime became aware of the negotiations, they ordered the talks to be stopped; in fact, insisted on a new offensive against Tito.
49. "Jane's Interview," Jane's Defense Weekly, 19 September 1992, 48.
50. Barbara Starr, "No speedy end to war, warns USA," Jane's Defense Weekly, 22 August 1992, 12.
51. Michael Gordon, "60,000 Needed for Bosnia, A U.S. General Estimates," New York Times, 12 August 1992, sec. A, p. 8.
52. Ibid.
53. "Brutalised," Economist, 1 August 1992, 38-39.
54. "Killers under Noms de Guerre," London Times, 4 February 1993, 13 and James Gow, "Military-Political Affiliations in the Yugoslav Conflict," RFE/RL 1, no. 20 (15 May 1992): 16-25.
55. "Turning Point in Europe," Economist, 11 January 1992, 43.
56. "Serbs Attack Muslim Slavs and Croats in Bosnia," New York Times, 4 April 1992, sec. A, p. 3.
57. "Killers under Noms de Guerre," 13 and Gow, "Military-Political Affiliations in the Yugoslav Conflict," 16-25.
58. "Young Guns: Youthful Mercenaries Join Bosnians," Prodigy Services, 9 June 1992.
59. Starr, 12.
60. Chuck Sudetic, "Forces in Bosnia Begin to Unravel," New York Times, 6 May 1992, sec. A, p. 16.
61. James Gow, "The Remains of the Yugoslav People's Army," Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1992, 359-362.
62. "Blood and tears," Economist, 9 May 1992, 57.

63. Milan Vego, "Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Hercegovina," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, 445-449.

64. For example, roughly 100,000 JNA soldiers were reported in Bosnia Hercegovina on 7 April 1992, the date of US recognition of Bosnia. Chuck Sudetic, "Croat Towns Bombed in Bosnia and Hercegovina," New York Times, 8 April 1992, sec. A, p. 10.

65. Vego, "Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Hercegovina," 445-449.

66. John Burns, "Taped Order Loud and Clear," New York Times, 9 June 1992, sec. A, p. 10.

67. Glenny, 26-29.

68. Paul Beaver, "The UN secures a foothold towards peace in Sarajevo," Jane's Defense Weekly, 11 July 1992, 18.

69. Vego, "Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Hercegovina," 445-449.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Vego, "The Army of Bosnia and Hercegovina," 63-67.

74. This analysis of Croat forces was synthesized from a variety of sources taken from all the participants' media. Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina (Sarajevo), 11 February 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-030 (17 February 1993): 39-40; Tanjug (Belgrade), 31 January 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-019 (1 February 1993): 56; Tanjug (Belgrade), 7 January 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-005 (8 January 1993): 28-29; Dnevnik (Novi Sad), 12 December 1992 cited in FBIS EEU-93-001 (4 January 1993): 59-61; Vojska (Belgrade), 8 October 1992 cited in FBIS EEU-92-213 (3 November 1992): 29-31 and Novi Vjesnik (Zagreb), 15 October also cited in FBIS EEU-92-213 (3 November 1992): 26-28.

CHAPTER 5

U.S. INTERESTS AND ACTIONS IN BOSNIA

Having delved into the problems of Bosnia in some detail in the previous chapters, we have identified several key pieces of information. The four central problems of Bosnia are:

- Bosnian Serb-Muslim War over Internal Borders
- Bosnia's Independence
- Ethnic Cleansing
- Refugees

The four most useful or probable solution sets that can be extrapolated from the problem analysis are:

- Peace Enforcement Operations
- Arming the Bosnian Government
- Increased Humanitarian Relief Support
- Peacekeeping Operations in Support of an Armistice

And, the three key assumptions considered in formulating the solutions are:

- Croatian Cooperation or Acquiescence
- U.N. Mandates Action Under chapter Six or Seven
- Continued Economic and Diplomatic Sanctions

Before considering what U.S. interests or objectives might

be at risk from the conflict in Bosnia, exploring the nature of the four generic solution sets available is worthwhile.

Foreign military intervention to conduct peace enforcement operations appears to offer the only probable method to create the political conditions in Bosnia needed to resolve all four of these problems. The phrase "political conditions," as opposed to the term "end-state," acknowledges the limited nature of military success in Bosnia (short of trying to occupy the entire nation by sheer weight of arms). Peace enforcement operations will most certainly force the termination of some if not all humanitarian relief missions.

As discussed in a chapters three and four, a credible ground threat directed against critical Bosnian Serb armor and mechanized formations, logistics sites, and command and control nodes associated with the former Yugoslav National Army corps has a high probability of success. Success constitutes convincing the Bosnian Serbs corps commanders and the political leadership of the Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAO) to accept a version of the Vance-Owen plan. The subsequent reduction in Serb territory to 43 percent of Bosnia in three noncontiguous cantons under Vance-Owen would, of course, only become acceptable if the Bosnian Serb leadership believed they stood to lose significantly more land by not participating in the peace

plan. Preventing intervention by the Yugoslav Army across the Sava and Drina rivers offers little difficulty.

Without heavy weapons of their own, Bosnian government forces could only recover territory by advancing in the wake of intervention forces. The purpose of the military operations is, after all, to make clear to the Bosnian Serbs that the balance of power has irrevocably shifted, not conquer every meter of Bosnia-Hercegovina for the Bosnian government. The surrender of most of the Bosnian Serb heavy weapons would need to be implemented as a first step under a Vance-Owen plan.

Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen's peace plan has been referred to many times in this paper but not examined in great detail. The reason for such obfuscation lies in the dynamic nature of the peace plan itself. The content of the plan changes as the situation evolves.¹ Thus, Vance-Owen represents a necessary political condition on the road to an as yet malleable end-state.

Examining the other possible solutions, none offer any probable resolution to the four central problems of Bosnia. Options to train and equip the Bosnian government army and even to support them with western air power offer a slim possibility to achieve the conditions for a Vance-Owen peace accord to be implemented. Time works against the Bosnian Muslims from a military standpoint, yet training and equipping essentially a new Bosnian government army would

take a year or more. The advantage of pursuing this solution lies in the notion that an international effort has been made that might work, yet involves no ground combat forces. A disadvantage is the likely termination of many humanitarian relief operations.

Introducing more forces for humanitarian relief escort at least addresses the immediate well-being of Bosnian refugees and sporadically sustains the various Muslim enclaves which remain of independent Bosnia. The risks to these U.N. sponsored forces remain high, however the risks to national prestige for the countries involved remains low. In fact, the conduct of humanitarian relief missions partly answers the ethical demand to alleviate the suffering in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Proposals to deploy peacekeeping forces to Bosnia to maintain an armistice, without implementation of a Vance-Owen peace plan, portend as ominous a task as common wisdom and western military leaders have portrayed. While peace enforcement operations would attack the Bosnian Serb military forces, peacekeeping would see those same forces intact, with the initiative, and providing safe havens for the various militias and paramilitaries. And given the Bosnian Serb military advantage, no compelling reason for them to honor the mandate of a peacekeeping force is apparent. For precisely the opposite reason, Bosnian Muslim tolerance of any operation short of peace enforcement looks

equally improbable. Therefore, if international sanctions and diplomatic pressure force the Muslim and Serb factions to permit the deployment of peacekeeping forces to monitor a Bosnian armistice, those intervention forces will be attacked and threatened by all sides. As with the escort of humanitarian aid convoys, participation in a peacekeeping force would demonstrate that some action was taking place to alleviate the suffering of the Bosnian people.

The next step is to identify U.S. national interests and supporting objectives, how the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina affects those interests and objectives, and suggest what feasible, suitable, and acceptable U.S. military objectives in Bosnia might support the achievement of U.S. national objectives.

U.S. Interests

The National Security Strategy of the United States was released prior to the change in U.S. administrations in 1993² We can assume that President Clinton and his administration accept similar definitions of U.S. national interests.³ Exploring these interests and supporting objectives in some detail is necessary.

Survival

Survival is the most important of U.S. interests, arguably the vital interest that the remaining interests support. It encompasses not just the security of the

nation, but its people, fundamental values, and institutions as well.

Global and Regional Stability

This interest has both an ethical foundation and a practical basis. Stability contributes to peaceful coexistence among nations and peoples. Peace, in turn, promotes economic development and free trade across the globe.

Four national objectives comprise U.S. efforts to promulgate regional stability. First, protect the U.S. and its citizens from attack. Second, honor historic, treaty and collective defense agreements. Third, make certain no hostile power can dominate a region critical to our interests. Fourth, reduce the sources of regional instability through limiting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and strengthening foreign civilian control of militaries.

Democracies

The U.S. also has an interest in promoting the development and sustainment of democratic institutions, particularly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, because nations with representative governments are less likely to start wars.

Free Trade

Global access to markets and capital are considered critical to the health of the U.S. economy and therefore its survival.

Leadership in Crisis Response

While the U.S. advocates sharing responsibility and risk in dealing with problems around the world, without U.S. leadership collective engagements may not prove timely or decisive. The U.S. retains an obligation to assume that leadership role when necessary.

U.S. Interests and Policy Formulation

Within this framework of national interests, the U.S. defines the needs of the nation. More than that, these interests suggest that potentially conflicting motivations exist in the national psyche that affect the making of policy. U.S. interests represent a blend of the moral and the pragmatic. Historically, U.S. foreign policy, to include the waging of war, has been most effective when both aspects of this duality are synchronized. However, the open policy debate of the mid-1980's conducted by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Schultz highlighted the complexity of blending the moral and material in the development and execution of U.S. policy.'

The Weinberger doctrine, discussed in the first chapter of this paper, remains relevant today through the

words of General Powell and others.⁵ As noted earlier, the doctrine cast limits on the use of military power as an implement of U.S. policy. With the Vietnam debacle in mind, the doctrine identified the importance of having achievable objectives and national will as the yin and yang of properly using military force. In many ways, the senior leadership of the U.S. Department of Defense have become the guardians of restraint in the exercise of military power.

The introduction to this paper posited the various pressures and concerns, primarily ethical, which might lead to the inappropriate commitment of U.S. forces to Bosnia. In exploring the problems and solutions of Bosnia, the point was to determine what rational military courses of action might create success, or limit failure, in Bosnia. This study indicates that a peace enforcement solution meets the definition of a reasonably attainable military objective supporting a political goal--to wit, acceptance of a Vance-Owen peace process by the belligerents.

Thus, one of the two most important liabilities (per the Weinberger doctrine) in considering the use of U.S. military power in Bosnia may no longer apply. Of course, the lack of national will remains an obstacle to even considering accomplishing military objectives in Bosnia. A typical poll shows only about 30 percent of the American public favoring some type of U.S. commitment of troops.⁶ Thus, before even identifying U.S. interests and objectives

possibly at stake in Bosnia, another insurmountable obstacle from the Weinberger doctrine seems to restrain any thought of employing U.S. forces.

George Schultz observed that perhaps too much restraint was built into Weinberger's view of the world.⁷ The appeasement of Adolph Hitler was obviously a mistake, yet a national policy that challenged Hitler, and risked initiating a war with Germany, probably would have failed the Weinberger test. Obviously Serbia and Nazi Germany are not comparable. The lesson, though, is that good policy cannot always wait on U.S. national will to percolate. In other words, a moral and practical consensus among Americans may form only after policy execution.

Thus, assuming for the moment that important U.S. interests exist, the quandary becomes how long good policy should wait on the clearly desirable manifestation of popular support. The marginal endorsement of policy, which fractious debate about risks and benefits produced in the Congress, for the war against Saddam Hussein suggests that the Weinberger doctrine may be too restrictive. While that doctrine has served admirably in protecting the armed forces of the U.S. from another Vietnam experience, it is worth considering that a higher level of risk would be more beneficial to the nation.

From this basis, the controversial question returns of how the conflict in Bosnia may influence the attainment of U.S. interests and objectives.

U.S. Interests in Bosnia

Ethnic cleansing and the other related outrages taking place in Bosnia have obvious moral implications detrimental to U.S. interests. Ralph Johnson, a senior U.S. State Department official, noted these implications to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 1991.⁸ Secretary of State Warren Christopher also acknowledged these humanitarian interests in February 1993. At the same time Christopher defined the more pragmatic concerns of the U.S. with regard to the conflict in Bosnia:

Beyond these humanitarian interests, we have direct strategic concerns as well. The continuing destruction of a new UN member state challenges the principle that internationally recognized borders should not be altered by force. In addition, this conflict itself has no natural borders. It threatens to spill over into new regions, such as Kosovo and Macedonia. It could then become a greater Balkan war, like those that preceded World War I. Broader hostilities could touch additional nations, such as Greece, Albania, and Turkey. The river of fleeing refugees, which has already reached the hundreds of thousands, would swell. The political and economic vigor of Europe, already tested by the integration of former communist states, would be further strained.⁹

Christopher as well cited the example Bosnia might set as a precedent for the resolution of ethnic and religious minority in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The debate centers on whether achievement of our interests is so endangered by not resolving Bosnia's current problems that military intervention to conduct peace enforcement becomes an acceptable option. The present administration had not reached that conclusion as of February 1993.¹⁰ However, by April 1993 President Clinton suggested that such an option could be considered, if as Warren Christopher related to Congress, four conditions were met:

The goal was stated clearly to the American people.

There must be strong likelihood of success

There must be an exit strategy

The action must win sustained public support¹¹

This change did not arise from a new interpretation of U.S. interests in Bosnia. President Clinton confirmed as recently as May 1993 that those humanitarian and practical interests remained essentially unchanged.¹² Clearly the failure of other elements of power to resolve the situation in Bosnia has at least convinced some members of the executive branch that peace enforcement operations in Bosnia are necessary.¹³

Others believe that U.S. interests are not at risk. Doug Seay of the Heritage Foundation wrote an analysis which concluded that U.S. interests would not be significantly damaged by the events in Bosnia.¹⁴ Seay considered two of the sources of practical concern to U.S. interests which

have been debated: instability in Europe's new democracies due to the spread of nationalist aggression and the possibility of a Balkan war. He found it highly unlikely that further nationalist conflicts in Europe would draw the major powers into a war; therefore, the net effect of more conflicts on U.S. interests was minimal. He further doubted the likelihood of a Balkan war. Even if it did occur, again the major European powers were not likely to participate. Overall, he noted that if another case was to be made for tying U.S. interests to Bosnia, then it needed to be explained by the administration.

George Kennan has remarked that the nationalist issues of the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe warrant great concern as a threat to the "stability of international life."¹⁵ Considered by many to be the most influential architect and advocate of the U.S. Cold War strategy of containment, Kennan points out that the need for the U.S. to refocus resources inward requires the development of regional collective responses to crises. Failing to develop a method to deal with ethnic conflict in Europe will greatly impede the ability of the U.S. to secure many of its national interests through the rest of the decade.¹⁶

Seay's conclusions regarding a Balkan war appear equally debatable. While the interests of the various Balkan and European powers have many permutations, the

crucial ones are Greece and Turkey.¹⁷ They will probably not fight a war concurrent with the conflict in Bosnia, as Seay realized, because Bulgaria is unlikely to permit Turkish troops to get to the land borders of former Yugoslavia, which would trigger a Greek response. However, Greece and Turkey might very well become engaged because of Bosnia.

If Serbian repression in Kosovo increases dramatically or Macedonia comes under attack, then Turkey and other Islamic nations would have little reason to await a decisive Western response. Lacking faith in Western resolve, interested nations, who were for the most part geographically isolated from Bosnia, can and may deploy forces into Albania. From Albania, Turkey and the Arab world can access both Kosovo and Macedonia. Turkish forces in Albania would significantly increase the possibility of an escalation in the region a general Balkan war. Two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies fighting each other could threaten the entire European security apparatus.¹⁸ Thus, Bosnia could evolve into a serious threat against our collective defense strategy in Europe.

Actually another case can be made which neither Seay nor Warren Christopher address. U.S. credibility may be on the line in Bosnia. It seems easy to forget that the U.S. coalition against Iraq involved many nations whose survival and oil supply was not threatened by the occupation of

Kuwait. Collective security hinges on compromise arrangements; for the U.S. not to act on the moral imperatives it invoked for Desert Storm could have tremendous impact on future consensus, particularly in the Islamic world, to resolve problems that are critical to our national survival. As Machiavelli noted, the appearance of morality is often what is important to a prince.¹⁹ If the U.S. wishes to fill a leadership role in its own interests, then it cannot dismiss Machiavelli's observation.

As considered earlier in this paper, the perception that any U.S. military intervention on the ground in Bosnia would be disastrous has forced the U.S. to rely upon the other elements of national power to resolve the war. Those efforts have failed for the reasons developed in earlier chapters and noted by some officials of the executive branch. However, the military analysis in this paper suggests that an intervention is at least conceivable, if peace enforcement and not peacekeeping is the venue selected.

Whether or not U.S. practical and moral interests are at stake in Bosnia requires decisions to be made on debatable subjects. This paper does not seek to recommend a particular interpretation. U.S. interests in Bosnia clearly exist, but in a more convoluted form than can be found in the oil wells of Kuwait and the evil of Saddam Hussein. This study does suggest that, for whatever reason a U.S.

military presence might be required in Bosnia, a peace enforcement mission is feasible, suitable, and possible to make acceptable. That is, U.S. interests are sufficient for the administration to make a strong case with the American people. And they ultimately decide what is and is not acceptable.

As the crisis in Bosnia ages, some of the analysis in earlier chapters may no longer apply as the factions involved change their political objectives. This could result from changes in leadership or the introduction of new weapons or soldiers by other external actors. Still, perhaps some value may be gleaned from a consideration of the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of two possible U.S. strategies which apply the generic peace enforcement solutions discussed earlier in this chapter

U.S. Strategy for Bosnia

U.S. led multinational corps attack on Hercegovina Corps

A multinational corps of U.S., French, and British forces lands at the port of Ploce, secures lodgements and advances northeast against the Bosnian Serb Hercegovina Corps. An ultimatum is issued for the surrender of heavy weapons and key sustainment facilities for heavy forces. An attempt to evacuate heavy units will be interdicted by air power. Based on the results of this operation the other corps and Serb Autonomous Regions (SAOs) would very probably go to the negotiating table for Vance-Owen protection.

Suitability of this approach was examined in chapter four. Namely, attacking the center of gravity (the key heavy forces of the corps) of the Bosnian Serbs will result in negotiations to accept Vance-Owen or in the Bosnian government taking territory by force. Without their heavy forces, the Serbs could still hold their lines against the Bosnian Muslims for some time, but the handwriting would be on the wall. Depending on the degree of resistance, equipping the Bosnian government with some new weapons may enhance the desired affect. Only when all the leaders of the SAOs and Serb corps in Bosnia realize that they have lost their military advantage will they come to the bargaining table in good faith.

Feasibility was addressed in the course of the military analysis. It is important to keep in mind the lessons of the German experience, the vulnerability of the Serb lines of communication, and the static nature of the Bosnian Serb corps. The real test of feasibility is the lodgement issue at Ploce. The port has received considerable damage in the past. Croatian cooperation would be needed. Once U.S. forces had secured a lodgement, subsequent negotiations to provide Muslim access to the port in the future could be critical in securing the maintenance of any independence for a Bosnian state.

Acceptability of this option depends upon the President and Congress. If they believed the plan would

work, they could probably mobilize sufficient national will on both moral and practical grounds. The European disdain for air attacks on Serb targets does not have any relevance for a U.S. commitment to a peace enforcement mission with ground forces which is feasible and suitable. What they and General Powell seem to have greatest concern about is an armed intervention short of such action, which would likely accomplish nothing, except to put humanitarian relief workers and peacekeepers in harms way. The aggressive nature of this operation would generate some domestic and international criticism.

U.S.-led multinational corps interdicts the Krajina

A multinational corps enters Croatia from the major port of Split and advances through Croatian, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Muslim lines of communication, breaking the sieges of Sarajevo and Tuzla. The Bosnian Serb Sarajevo Corps could retreat eastward for a short distance. It would have to be blocked from returning to the city. From Tuzla, the corridor linking the Krajina Serbs with Serbia and Eastern Bosnia could be blocked, creating a devastating psychological and practical effect. Serb attacks would be almost certain and quickly reveal their military plight.

Suitability of this option relies upon the impact of the movement into the Krajina Serbs achilles's heel. A subsequent offensive operation west may prove necessary. This proposal has an advantage over the first strategy in

that the military capability of the two corps of the Krajina Serbs are the most important of Serb centers of gravity.

Feasibility depends not just on the Croatians, but the Bosnian Croats as well. The long line of communication would be vulnerable to Croatian interdiction rather easily. Otherwise the same factors as in the first strategy apply.

Acceptability is better in this option than the previous strategy in one respect, since it accomplishes the relief of besieged cities and occupation of terrain initially in lieu of taking on a Serb corps directly. It could takes more time to convince the Bosnian Serbs that their military advantage is over. Time is probably the most important challenge to acceptability after casualty considerations.

Conclusions

This paper attempted to address the possibility that U.S. military forces might find themselves committed to Bosnia-Herzegovina without an appropriate mission. The difficulty in analyzing Bosnia's problems and deducing some solutions was tackled, as well as a review of some of the preconceived notions about the nature of the conflict in Bosnia. If U.S. forces find themselves pending deployment to Bosnia, this analysis could prove helpful in redirecting the mission to achievable military objectives which support quantifiable political objectives. In this final chapter, some discussion of the moral and practical impact Bosnia has

on U.S. interests as of early 1993 was presented. Finally, two somewhat simplistic strategies were proposed to illustrate the potential use of the analysis contained in this paper.

Four important issues were not developed to any depth in this paper, but merit concern nonetheless. First, designing the force structure for a peace enforcement operation in Bosnia poses special challenges, due to both the terrain and the difficulty in identifying the enemy. Second, conducting the transition from peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operations under U.N. auspices to peace enforcement would appear to be difficult and hazardous. Third, the impact of Western actions in Bosnia upon the government of Boris Yeltsin must be considered. Whether the historic Russian-Serbian ties present a major concern or a minor inconvenience depends upon events beyond the scope of this study. Finally, the position of the Croatian government with regard to operations in Bosnia must be clearly established prior to any military commitment. Of late, President Tudjman seems to have begun to play a new game in Bosnia.

Endnotes

1. Two discussions of changes in the Vance-Owen plan in February 1993 were discussed by Bosnian President Izetbegovic on Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina (Sarajevo), 11 February 1993 and by Bosnian Serb Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha in Tanjug (Belgrade), 11 February 1993, both cited in FBIS EEU-93-028 (12 February 1993): 24-25.

2. George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993): 1-21.

3. President Clinton's inaugural address highlighted the same national security interests found in the 1993 National Security Strategy. "Excerpts From President's Inaugural Address," State Department Dispatch 4, no. 4 (25 January 1993): 46-49.

4. This debate is explored in great detail in Ethics and American Power Ethics and Public Policy Essay 59, ed., Ernest Lefever (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1985).

5. Ibid., 1-10. The Weinberger doctrine's six points are quoted on pages 34-36 of this paper.

6. Stephen Budiansky et al., "Rules of Engagement," U.S. News & World Report, 25 January 1993, 53-55.

7. George Schultz, "The Ethics of Power," Ethics and American Power Ethics and Public Policy Essay 59, ed. Ernest Lefever (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1985), 11-17 and in the same document Smith Hempstone, "The Weinberger-Schultz Debate is Beneficial," 21-23.

8. "U.S. Efforts To Promote A Peaceful Settlement in Yugoslavia," State Department Dispatch 2, no. 42 (21 October 1991): 782.

9. "New Steps Toward Conflict Resolution in the Former Yugoslavia," State Department Dispatch 4, no. 7 (15 February 1993): 81-82.

10. Ibid.

11. "Force in Bosnia Outlined," Kansas City Star, 28 April 1993, sec. A, p. 1.

13. Note the actions of Madeline Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, and one dozen foreign service officers for the Balkan region in the State Department in "State Department experts call for use of U.S. force in Bosnia," Kansas City Star, 24 April 1993, sec. A, p. 10.

14. Doug Seay, "U.S. and Bosnia: Too Late, Wrong War," Background (Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 20 July 1992), 1-10.

15. George Kennan, Around the Cragged Hill (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co, 1993), 84-95.

16. Ibid., 84-95, 184-185.

17. For an excellent discussion of the alliances shaping up in the region see Franz-Lothar Altmann, "Ex-Yugoslavia's neighbors: who wants what," The World Today 48, no. 8,9 (August/September 1992): 163-165 and Bruce George and Nick Ryan, "The War in Former Yugoslavia: Prospects for Resolution," (9 November 1992) Study, 53-60.

18. The Turkish-Greek conflict in Cyprus, of course, did not destroy NATO. However, the threat of the Soviet Union served to provide a reason to limit the escalation of the war over Cyprus. A similar restraint does not appear to be available today.

19. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (New York: New American Library, 1935, repr., 1952), 84.

APPENDIX A
MEDIA DATA

One of the research tools employed in this effort was the Christian Science Monitor. All issues were reviewed from October 1991 through December 1992. From these, the articles discussing the former Yugoslavia were analyzed to extract causes and symptoms of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as to observe the growth in advocacy for military intervention.

To condense the data displayed in table 2, the various categories of Bosnia's problems have been assigned alphanumeric designations in table 1. These designations do not constitute a priority of importance. Chapter three defines the problems in detail. Chapter four contains a detailed discussion of military intervention.

The Monitor reflected a decided editorial slant towards military intervention, roughly two-to-one in favor. However, as the data shows, opposing views appear at least in effigy. Of course, all the statistics reflect the subjective judgement of this author. Vagaries aside, the data (in bold script) suggests the possible correlation of several problems to an increased discussion of military intervention in the Monitor.

Table 1.--Shorthand designations of data arrayed in Table 2.

| <u>Designation</u> | <u>Causes</u> |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| C1 | War between Serbia and Croatia |
| C2 | Bosnian Independence |
| C3 | Bosnian Defense Industry |
| C4 | International Recognition of Bosnia |
| C5 | Bosnia's Internal Borders |
| C6 | Yugoslav National Army |
| C7 | Serbian Coast |
| C8 | Economic |

| <u>Designation</u> | <u>Causes and Symptoms</u> |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| CS1 | Nationalism |
| CS2 | Militias and Paramilitaries |
| CS3 | Anti-"Federalism" |
| CS4 | Propaganda |
| CS5 | Violence |
| CS6 | Historic Hate |
| CS7 | Ethnic Cleansing |

| <u>Designation</u> | <u>Symptoms</u> |
|--------------------|------------------|
| S1 | Air Attacks |
| S2 | Hostage Taking |
| S3 | Rape |
| S4 | Sieges |
| S5 | Food and Shelter |
| S6 | Camps |
| S7 | Refugees |
| S8 | Bombardment |
| S9 | Land Mines |

| <u>Designation</u> | <u>Military Intervention</u> |
|--------------------|------------------------------|
| I1 | For Generic Intervention |
| I2 | Against Generic Intervention |
| I3 | For U.S. Intervention |
| I4 | Against U.S. Intervention |

| <u>Designation</u> | <u>Total Reporting</u> |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| T1 | Any Reporting on Sarajevo |
| T2 | Any Reporting on Bosnia-Herzegovina |
| T3 | Any Reporting on former Yugoslavia |

Table 2.--Number of days per month a problem was discussed in the
Christian Science Monitor

| | <---1991---> | | | | | | | | <---1992---> | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------|----|----|---|----|---|----|--|
| | O | N | D | J | F | M | A | M | J | J | A | S | O | N | D | |
| C1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | |
| C2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | |
| C3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| C4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| C5 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 5 | |
| C6 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | |
| C7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| C8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | |
| CS1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 11 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 12 | |
| CS2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 5 | |
| CS3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | |
| CS4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | |
| CS5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 12 | |
| CS6 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | |
| CS7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 10 | |
| S1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | |
| S2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | |
| S3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 5 | |
| S4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 3 | |
| S5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | |
| S6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 4 | |
| S7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 7 | |
| S8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 3 | |
| S9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | |
| I1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 10 | |
| I2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 9 | |
| I3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 7 | |
| I4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 7 | |
| T1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 6 | |
| T2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 16 | |
| T3 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 12 | 11 | 9 | 11 | 9 | 16 | |

APPENDIX B

ORDER OF BATTLE DATA

The Bosnian Serb Army¹

III North Bosnian Corps: Bijeljina

- 3 Motorized Brigades (Mtz Bde)
- 1 Infantry Brigade (Inf Bde)
- 1 Partisan² Brigade (Part Bde)
- 1 Partisan Division (Part Div)
- 1 Artillery Regiment (Arty Rgt)
- 1 Artillery Brigade (Arty Bde)
- 2 Light Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments (AAA Rgt)

I Krajina Corps: Banja Luka

- 1 Mechanized Brigade (Mech Bde)
- 1 Mtz Bde
- 1 Inf Bde
- 1 Part Div
- 5 Territorial Defense Brigades³ (TDF Bde)
- 2 Mountain Brigades (Mtn Bde)
- 1 Self-propelled Artillery Regiment (SP Arty Rgt)
- 1 Arty Rgt
- 1 Anti-tank Regiment (AT Rgt)
- 1 AAA Rgt

II Krajina Corps: Drvar

- 1 Armored Brigade (Ar Bde)
- 2 Mtz Bdes
- 2 Arty Rgt
- 1 AT Rgt
- 1 Arty Bde
- 1 AAA Rgt

Knin Operational Group: on Bosnian territory near Knin in Croatia

- 1 Ar Bde
- 1 Mtz Bde
- 1 Inf Bde
- 2 AAA Rgts

IV East Bosnian Corps: Pale (just southeast of Sarajevo)

- 1 Mech Bde
- 1 Mtz Bde
- 1 Mtn Bde
- 1 Part Div
- 1 Frog Surface to Surface Rocket Brigade
- 1 Arty Rgt
- 1 AT Rgt
- 1 AAA Rgt

Uzice Corps (Operations Group or Forward Command Post?): Nevesinje, at least some elements of the corps probably remain, although the Corps headquarters remains in Serbia.⁴ Some units have possibly rotated back into Bosnia by at least February 1993.

- 1 Ar Bde
- 6 Mtz Bdes
- 2 Mtn Bdes
- 2 Arty Rgts
- 1 AT Rgt

Herzegovinian Corps: Bileca, probably many units rotate from bases in Montenegro. Engaged in operations again by February 1993.

- 4 Mtz Bdes
- 2 Mtn Bdes
- 1 Part Div
- 1 Arty Rgt
- 1 AT Rgt
- 1 AAA Rgt

The Army of Bosnia and Hercegovina⁵

Sarajevo Area: 22,000

- I Corps: Sarajevo
- 4 to 5 brigades⁶

"1st Tactical Group" at Kiseljak, northwest of Sarajevo siege lines.⁷

Central Bosnia: 15,000

- III Corps: Zenica
- 6 brigades
- Phalanx of Believers (400-600 Mojahedin)

Eastern Bosnia: 10,000

4 to 6 brigades in Srebrenica and Gorazde (several probably destroyed in March and April 1993 Serb offensives)

Northern Bosnia: 15,000

- II Corps: Tuzla
- 6 brigades

Northwestern Bosnia: 10,000

V Corps: Bihac
7 brigades

Hercegovina: 8000

IV Corps: Mostar
3 brigades

"4th Tactical Group Igman," positioned on hills southwest of Sarajevo siege lines in the vicinity of Mount Igman.⁹

The Bosnian Croat Army⁹

Central Bosnia Operations Zone: 10,000-20,000, works with Bosnian government III Corps
10-15 brigades

Southeastern Hercegovina Operations Zone: 10,000-20,000, works with Bosnian government with IV Corps
10-15 brigades

Bosanska Posavina Operations Zone: 5,000-10,000, works with Bosnian government II Corps
5-10 brigades

Endnotes

1. Vego, "Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Hercegovina," 445-449.

2. Partisan units represent formations of the old Yugoslav National Army designed to operate in local areas or regions, under federal control. In fact, especially in the case of partisan divisions, many of the local militias probably have been amalgamated into partisan units to enter the corps administrative and logistics chains.

3. Territorial Defense Forces, while nominally responsive to federal army control, developed into separate forces exclusively under the control of the republics, or in some cases, even the local region where they were levied.

4. The Uzice Corps headquarters was shown in Serbia as of probably October 1992 in James Gow, "The Yugoslav Army--An Update," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1992, 501.

5. Vego, "The Army of Bosnia and Hercegovina," 63-67.

6. As late as 13 February 1993, Izetbegovic stated the Sarajevo Corps had 17 brigades. He noted that they wished to consolidate these 17 brigades into fewer, but larger brigades. Thus, the figure of 4-5 brigades is valid. This does point out the difficulty in evaluating force structure by nomenclature alone. Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina (Sarajevo), 13 February 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-029 (16 February 1993): 42.

7. Probably an entity which coordinates joint Croat and Muslim operations in the area.

8. Probably an entity which coordinates joint Croat and Muslim operations in the area.

9. This material was synthesized from a variety of media sources representing all sides in the conflict. Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina (Sarajevo), 11 February 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-030 (17 February 1993): 39-40; Tanjug (Belgrade), 31 January 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-019 (1 February 1993): 56; Tanjug (Belgrade), 7 January 1993 cited in FBIS EEU-93-005 (8 January 1993): 28-29; Dnevnik (Novi Sad), 12 December 1992 cited in FBIS EEU-93-001 (4 January 1993): 59-61; Vojska (Belgrade), 8 October 1992 cited in FBIS EEU-92-213 (3 November 1992): 29-31 and Novi Vjesnik (Zagreb), 15 October 1992 also cited in FBIS EEU-92-213 (3 November 1992): 26-28.


APPENDIX C
GENERAL REFERENCE MAPS

Many books, periodicals, and journals serve as excellent sources for a wide variety of maps on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia. While the intent and format of this study precluded any competition in the graphics arena, it seemed obvious that some general reference maps would be very useful for the reader to have at hand. This should not prohibit the serious student of Bosnia from acquiring other maps to use in conjunction with this work. For example, many of the European road maps and guides are updated frequently. Information gleaned from older U.S. military maps should be interpreted judiciously. Geographic displays would have been desirable as well, but could not be accommodated in the production of this thesis.

The Foreign Military Studies Office graciously consented for reproduction of all but the first map in this Appendix. Hopefully, the reader will find these helpful in considering the information presented in this work.



Figure 1. Map of the former Yugoslavia. Additional major river lines in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been added. Bosnia-Herzegovina is generally bounded by the Sava river in the north, the Drina to the east, the Una to the west, and the Dalmatian coast to the south. Map reproduced with the permission of World Atlas (tm), copyright 1990-1991, The Software Toolworks, Inc., Novato, California 94949.



MAP OF BOSNIA HERCEGOVINA AND PART OF CROATIA




Figure 2. Ethnic distribution in Bosnia-Hercegovina according to district borders.




Figure 3. Ethnic distribution reflecting changes in demographics between the 1981 and 1991 census.



Figure 4. Vance-Owen Peace Plan. Creation of 10 provinces, each with an ethnic plurality deduced from the 1991 census.




Figure 5. Military situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina as of late 1992/early 1993.



Figure 6. Vance-Owen Peace Plan autonomous regions considered in light of the military situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina as of early May 1993.

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